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450 South State Street, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210 
Re: State v. Seruka Tillaia, No. 20041030-CA 
Utah R. App. R. 24(j) Supplemental Authority Letter 
Dear Ms. Collins: 
Pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State cites United 
Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, fflf 37-38 
(June 6, 2006), in support of the State's argument that defendant is obligated to marshal 
fact-dependent rulings irrespective of the standard of review on appeal. See Brief of 
Appellee at 17-24 & 32-35. This letter is submitted in response to defendant's argument 
that he need not marshal when a ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Reply 
Brief of Appellant at 2. 
This matter is set for oral argument tomorrow morning, Wednesday, June 14, 
2006, at 9:30 a.m. The State requests that this letter and the attached decision be 
distributed to the Court as supplemental authority. 
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CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL 
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES CO., a Delaware 
corporation, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS, a Netherlands association; Stichting 
Mayflower Recreational Fonds, a general 
partnership; Stichting Mayflower 
Recreation; Consolidated Mayflower Mines, Inc., a 
Utah corporation; Royal 
Street of Utah; Cooperative Centrale 
Raiffeisenboerenleenbank, B.A., a 
Netherlands corporation; May Finance C.V.; Deer 
Valley Resort, Inc., a Nevada 
corporation; and Newpark Resources, Inc., a 
Nevada corporation, Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No. 20040943. 
June 6, 2006. 
Fourth District, Heber Dep't; No. 000500087; The 
Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Jr. 
Laura S. Scott, Michael P. Petrogeorge, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff. 
E. Craig Smay, Salt Lake City, for appellants 
Wendy A. Faber, Salt Lake City, for defendant Deer 
Valley Resort. 
Casey K. McGarvey, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
Newpark Resources. 
PARRISH, Justice: 
*1 1f 1 Tlris case stems from the application of a 
much-favored property right: a cotenant's right to 
partition. Partition is intended to broker peace 
between feuding cotenants and promote the 
productive use of property. The scarcity of relevant 
case law is perhaps a reflection of the effectiveness 
and wisdom of the remedy. Nevertheless, a judicial 
partition can sometimes breed further contention 
and dissatisfaction. This is one such case. 
Tf 2 Appellants Stichting Mayflower Mountain 
Fonds and Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds 
(collectively, "Mayflower") challenge the trial 
court's partition of certain property located in 
Summit and Wasatch Counties and an 
accompanying award of owelty. Mayflower 
contends that appellee United Park City Mines 
Company ("United Park") waived its right to 
partition and that it was therefore error for the trial 
court to order the partition. Alternatively, 
Mayflower argues that the trial court erred in its 
calculation of the owelty award and its refusal to 
order an accounting. 
U 3 We reject Mayflower's challenge to the trial 
court's ruling because Mayflower has failed to 
marshal the evidence as required by rule 24(a)(9) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a result, 
we assume that the evidence supports the factual 
findings underlying the ruling. We therefore affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
I. FACTUAL HISTORY 
A. The Properties 
U 4 United Park and Mayflower own 
approximately 342 acres of property (the "Partition 
Property") as tenants in common. The Partition 
Property is comprised of certain patented mining 
claims located in the Uintah Mining District. 
Approximately 216 acres of the Partition Property 
lie in Summit County; the remaining acres are 
located in Wasatch County. The Partition Property 
is located in an area commonly known as "Upper 
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Mountain." 
f 5 Additionally, United Park and Mayflower 
each separately own nearby properties. United Park 
owns approximately 1400 acres of property located 
in Summit County (the "United Park Property"). 
Part of the United Park Property is an 84-acre 
parcel termed "Mountain Village," which is located 
in an area commonly known as "Lower Mountain." 
Another part of the United Park Property is a 
portion of the "Northside Neighborhood," a planned 
63-acre development in Upper Mountain. United 
Park and Deer Valley Resort Company ("Deer 
Valley") are the two main Northside Neighborhood 
property owners; three others also own interests in 
the Northside Neighborhood, including Mayflower. 
Mayflower solely owns approximately 50 to 60 
acres of Summit County property (the "Mayflower 
Property"). 
B. The Annexation and Development Agreement 
% 6 United Park has long sought to develop the 
United Park Property. But Summit County zoning 
regulations, which permitted only one unit of 
development per 40 acres, prevented large-scale 
development. In 1994, United Park petitioned Park 
City for annexation of approximately 1340 acres of 
land located in Summit County, seeking a 
regulatory framework more conducive to its 
development goals. Thus began a long and difficult 
negotiation process that ultimately culminated in 
United Park's partition petition. 
*2 1f 7 Park City allegedly responded to United 
Park's 1994 petition by insisting on two conditions 
to annexation: (1) that the annexation extend to the 
Summit County line and cover property owned by 
several different owners, including the United Park 
Property, the Mayflower Property, and the portion 
of the Partition Property lying within Summit 
County (collectively, the "Flagstaff Development"); 
and (2) that the Flagstaff Development be subject to 
a master development agreement (the 
"Development Agreement") regulating its use and 
development. United Park continued negotiating 
with Park City for over four years. United Park and 
Park City particularly struggled over how much 
development density to allocate to the Mountain 
Village and Northside Neighborhood developments. 
None of the other property owners ever participated 
in the negotiation process, nor did they bear the 
associated expenses. 
K 8 In 1997, the Park City planning commission 
approved United Park's proposal, which called for 
development in both the Upper Mountain and 
Lower Mountain areas. The city council, however, 
rejected the proposal and passed a resolution 
restricting development to Lower Mountain. 
Frustrated, United Park initiated parallel 
negotiations with Summit County for a deal that 
would amend that County's restrictive zoning 
regulations. Park City resumed negotiations with 
United Park shortly thereafter, and in 1998, the city 
council passed a resolution allowing for 
development on Upper Mountain. The annexation 
and the Development Agreement were both 
finalized on June 24, 1999. 
U 9 The Development Agreement permits 470 
residences, 16 single-family lots, and commercial 
development in Mountain Village. The 
Development Agreement also allows for the 
development of up to 38 single-family lots in the 
Northside Neighborhood. Under the Development 
Agreement, United Park and Deer Valley are 
collectively entitled to 30 lots in the Northside 
Neighborhood. The Development Agreement also 
authorizes 8 additional Northside Neighborhood 
lots (the "Conditional Lots"), but only in the event 
that the other three property owners, including 
Mayflower, elect to join in the Development 
Agreement. According to the Development 
Agreement, all development is to take place within 
discrete "development pods"; the majority of the 
Flagstaff Development— approximately 1500 
acres—is zoned as "recreational open space." 
1f 10 Approximately 3.5 acres of the Partition 
Property (the "Adjacent Property") are located 
adjacent to both the proposed subdivision within the 
Northside Neighborhood and the Mayflower 
Property. The Mayflower Property is also located 
adjacent to the proposed subdivision within the 
Northside Neighborhood. The portion of the 
Partition Property located in Wasatch County was 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?utid=%257bB217378A-4D2C-49AB-8D... 06/13/2006 
Page 4 of9 
2006 WL 1528607 
_.. p.3d —9 2006 WL 1528607 (Utah), 2006 UT 35 
(Cite as: 2006 WL 1528607 (Utah)) 
Page 3 
not annexed and is not subject to the Development 
Agreement. 
f 11 United Park made significant concessions as 
part of the Development Agreement. In exchange 
for enhanced development rights in the United Park 
Property and the Northside Neighborhood, United 
Park agreed not to develop (1) an approximately 
650-acre parcel in Summit County commonly 
known as "Richardson Flats"; (2) an approximately 
90-acre parcel located at the top of Iron Mountain; 
and (3) a parcel commonly known as "Prospect 
Ridge." United Park also agreed to "offer to 
dedicate to the City a conservation easement[ ] or 
deed" in order to preserve several parking lots 
located near City Hall. United Park was also forced 
to "ratchet down its proposed density" for its 
development of an approximately 1500-acre parcel 
in Wasatch County commonly known as "Bonanza 
Flats ." Additionally, United Park committed to 
operating private shuttle services within Mountain 
Village, as well as undertaking multi-million dollar 
road construction and renovation projects. As part 
of the Development Agreement, Park City acquired 
a conservation easement over 1,000-plus acres of 
property owned solely by United Park. United Park 
also agreed to either construct a gondola between 
the Flagstaff Mountain Resort and old town Park 
City or, if Park City demanded, pay one million 
dollars to Park City. 
C. The United Park-Mayflower Relationship 
*3 1f 12 Throughout its negotiations with Park 
City, United Park attempted to get Mayflower and 
the other Flagstaff Development property owners to 
participate in a joint venture. These efforts 
ultimately were unsuccessful. On February 25, 
1997, Hank Rothwell, the president of United Park, 
faxed a letter (the "1997 Letter") to Mayflower 
stating, "United Park or its representatives, will not 
annex [Mayflower's] property or accept a density 
approval for [Mayflower's] property without 
[Mayflower's] notification and permission." The 
1997 Letter was purportedly "reconfirmed" on 
March 20, 1997. Discussions between United Park 
and Mayflower continued, and on September 3, 
1998, Mayflower advised Park City in writing that 
it objected to the terms of the annexation. United 
Park grew increasingly frustrated by Mayflower's 
refusal to participate in any kind of joint venture, 
and on January 21, 1999, Rothwell sent a letter to 
Mayflower advising that United Park would "delete 
Mayflower property from [the] Master Planning 
effort." 
If 13 The annexation was finalized on June 24, 
1999, pursuant to Park City Ordinance No. 99-30. 
Although unilateral, the annexation petition was 
proper under Utah Code section 10-2-403(b) (1999) 
, which requires that a petition be signed by the 
owner or owners of "a majority of the private land 
area within the area proposed for annexation" that is 
"equal in value to at least 1/3 of the value of all 
private real property within the area proposed for 
annexation ." Because United Park was the 
undisputed majority property owner, its petition met 
these requirements. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1 14 In February 2000, United Park filed a 
complaint seeking partition of the Partition 
Property. As part of the partition process, the trial 
court appointed three referees to investigate the 
issues relevant to the partition and to produce a 
report recommending how the Partition Property 
should be divided. Each party chose one referee; 
those two referees in turn selected a third neutral 
referee. 
% 15 Over the course of several months, the 
referees reviewed the history of the annexation 
process and the resulting Development Agreement. 
The referees first focused their efforts on deciding 
how best to physically divide the Partition Property; 
they then investigated Mayflower's claims that the 
Development Agreement had resulted in a transfer 
of development density from the Partition Property 
and the Mayflower Property to Mountain Village 
and the Northside Neighborhood. The referees 
submitted their reports in April 2001. The neutral 
referee and the United Park referee signed the 
majority conclusions and recommendations (the 
"Majority Report"), while the Mayflower referee 
submitted a separate, dissenting report (the 
"Minority Report"). 
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If 16 The Majority Report recommended that the 
Partition Property be divided so that United Park 
and Mayflower each receive approximately 108 
acres in Summit County and roughly 63 acres in 
Wasatch County. Additionally, the Majority Report 
proposed that Mayflower be granted the Adjacent 
Property as part of its 108-acre Summit County 
allotment. The Majority Report further 
recommended that the trial court award Mayflower 
3 or 4 of the Conditional Lots. According to the 
Majority Report, this award would compensate 
Mayflower for density that was "probably relocated 
from the [Partition Property and the Mayflower 
Property] and clustered into the Northside 
Neighborhood." In making this recommendation, 
the authors of the Majority Report stated that they 
were "convinced that the density in the Flagstaff 
Development gained from the [Partition Property] 
and from [the Mayflower Property] is limited to 
Mayflower's fair portion of the [Conditional Lots] 
in the Northside Neighborhood." 
*4 U 17 The Minority Report did not dispute the 
Majority Report's proposed physical partition of the 
Partition Property. It disagreed with the Majority 
Report, however, as to how many of the Conditional 
Lots Mayflower should be awarded. The Minority 
Report found that density may have been 
transferred to Mountain Village from the Partition 
Property. According to the Minority Report's 
calculations, Mayflower was possibly entitled to a 
total of 7.85 to 8.1 lots. 
U 18 In March 2002, Mayflower amended its 
answer in the partition lawsuit to allege that United 
Park, through the 1997 Letter, had waived its right 
to partition the Partition Property. Both parties filed 
unsuccessful summary judgment motions in late 
2002. In May 2004, the court held a bench trial and 
subsequently issued a ruling adopting the 
recommendations of the Majority Report. The trial 
court issued amended findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and an order in October 2004, and 
Mayflower timely appealed. This court initially 
transferred the appeal to the court of appeals but 
subsequently vacated the transfer order and recalled 
the case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code section 78-2-2(3)0) (2002). 
ANALYSIS 
If 19 Our holding in this case is but the latest in a 
series of warning signs we must occasionally post 
for unsuspecting or overly clever parties. The 
following analysis should serve as frank, severe 
instruction for those parties who ask us to decide 
fact-dependent questions under the guise that they 
present only issues of law. 
K 20 While Mayflower purports to raise a 
multitude of issues in its briefs, the substance of this 
case can actually be distilled into two discrete 
questions: (1) whether the trial court erred in 
determining that United Park did not waive its right 
to partition; and (2) whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in fashioning the owelty award. 
Mayflower also requests an accounting. Because we 
conclude that Mayflower's claim for an accounting 
is duplicative of its request for an additional owelty 
award, we refuse to consider that claim. We 
therefore focus on the questions of waiver and 
owelty and discuss each in turn. 
I. WAIVER 
f 21 Whether a party has effectuated a waiver is a 
mixed question of law and fact. Chen v. Stewart, 
2004 UT 82, \ 23, 100 P.3d 1177; see also U.S. 
Realty 86 Assocs. v. Sec. Inv., Ltd., 2002 UT 14, ^ 
11, 40 P.3d 586. As we explained in Pledger v. 
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ^ 16, 982 P.2d 572, 
"[W]hether the trial court employed the proper 
standard of waiver presents a legal question which 
is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events 
allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature 
and should be reviewed as factual determinations." 
Accordingly, we "grant broadened discretion to the 
trial court's findings" when reviewing questions of 
waiver. Chen, 2004 UT 82, \ 23. 
K 22 We have repeatedly applied the rule clarified 
in Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan 
Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993), when 
evaluating questions of waiver. "A waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. To 
constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, 
benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, 
and an intention to relinquish it." Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also In re Flake, 2003 
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UT 17, If 30, 71 P.3d 589. Questions of waiver 
often hinge on the critical third element of intent. 
We have explained that the intent to relinquish a 
right must be distinct and that fact-finders should 
"look[ ] at the totality of the circumstances" in 
discerning intent. Id. 
*5 1| 23 Mayflower argues that United Park 
waived its right to seek a partition of the property. 
And there is no dispute that the first two elements of 
waiver were satisfied here: United Park had the 
right to a partition and was aware of that right. 
Accordingly, the existence of a waiver turns on the 
question of intent. On this point, the trial court 
found that "United Park ha [d] not waived its right 
to parrition[;][t]he [1997 Letter] ... did not evidence 
an intent by United Park to waive its right to 
partition." Because the issue of intent is 
determinative here, Mayflower must successfully 
challenge this factual finding if we are to reverse the 
trial court's ruling. This requires that Mayflower 
marshal all the evidence supporting that finding. 
Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9). Because Mayflower has 
failed to do so, we assume that the evidence 
supports the finding and consequently affirm. 
K 24 Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure requires "[a] party challenging a fact 
finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding." See also State v. 
Clark, 2005 UT 75, 1f 17, 124 P.3d 235; Wilson 
Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, U 
21, 54 P.3d 1177. To pass this threshold, parties 
protesting findings of fact must "marshal all the 
evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient 
to support the finding even when viewing it in a 
light most favorable to the court below." Clark, 
2005 UT 75, K 17 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
If 25 That waiver is a mixed question of law and 
fact does not relieve Mayflower of this important 
task. "Even where the defendants purport to 
challenge only the legal ruling, as here, if a 
determination of the correctness of a court's 
application of a legal standard is extremely 
fact-sensitive, the [appellants] also have a duty to 
marshal the evidence." Chen, 2004 UT 82, If 20. 
Mayflower cannot dodge this duty by attempting to 
frame the issues as legal ones. Because the question 
of waiver is so dependent on factual findings, 
Mayflower must marshal the evidence if it seeks to 
challenge the trial court's determination of that 
question. 
^ 26 Mayflower has not done so. It ostensibly 
makes an effort to marshal the evidence on pages 
21-22 of its brief: "It marshals the evidence ... to 
present the [1997 Letter] and testimony [of one 
witness]." But contrary to Mayflower's wistful 
assertion, presenting evidence supporting the 
challenged conclusion does not satisfy the 
marshaling requirement. Parties cannot discharge 
their duty by "simply providing] an exhaustive 
review of all evidence presented at trial." Chen, 
2004 UT 82, If 77. Rather, parties are required to 
"temporarily remove [their] own prejudices and 
fully embrace the adversary's position"; [they] 
must play the "devil's advocate." In so doing, 
appellants must present the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the trial court and not attempt 
to construe the evidence in a light favorable to 
their case.... In sum, to properly marshal the 
evidence the challenging party must demonstrate 
how the court found the facts from the evidence 
and then explain why those findings contradict 
the clear weight of the evidence. 
*6 Id. If 78 (quoting Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 
108, Tf 19, 57 P.3d 1093) (citations omitted). What 
Mayflower has done instead is "merely re-argue the 
factual case ... presented in the trial court," id. If 
77, leaving United Park and this court to bear the 
expense and time of performing the critical task of 
marshaling the evidence. This is unfair, inefficient, 
and unacceptable. See id. 
f 27 We repeatedly have warned of the grim 
consequences parties face when they fail to fulfill 
the marshaling requirement. When parties fail to 
perform this critical task, we can rely on that failure 
to affirm the lower court's findings of fact. Id. f^ 
80; see also Clark, 2005 UT 75, f 17. We 
therefore affirm the trial court's factual findings, 
including its determination that United Park did not 
intend to waive its right to partition. Because we 
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accept that finding of fact, we must also affirm the 
trial court's conclusion that United Park did not 
waive its right to partition. 
II. OWELTY 
If 28 Because this court has rarely reviewed 
owelty awards, we understand both parties' 
confusion as to the applicable standard of review. 
We therefore pause to clarify the correct standard. 
The owelty remedy, though enabled by statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-39-41 (2002), is an equitable form 
of relief. The statute itself recognizes the equitable 
nature of owelty: it empowers courts "to make 
compensatory adjustment among the parties 
according to the principles of equity." Id. (emphasis 
added). This is consistent with our characterization 
of partition, which we have held to be "an equitable 
action," in part because "[t]he fundamental 
objective in a partition action is to divide the 
property so as to be fair and equitable and confer 
no unfair advantage on any of the co-tenants." 
Blonquist v. Frandsen, 694 P.2d 595, 596 (Utah 
1984) (emphasis added). We therefore review 
awards of owelty as we do other forms of equitable 
relief. 
If 29 In equity cases, we review the trial court's 
legal conclusions for correctness. RHN Corp. v. 
Veibell, 2004 UT 60, H 35, 96 P.3d 935. We grant 
considerable deference to the trial court's factual 
findings and will not reverse those findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous. Id. 
1f 30 The equitable distribution of property, 
however, involves more than factual findings and 
legal conclusions: it requires trial courts to "balance 
[ ] the relative significance of the facts and 
applicable law in order to achieve a fair and 
equitable result. This balancing requires the 
exercise of discretion." Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 
UT 22, 1f 23, 112 P.3d 495. In partition actions, 
trial courts are specifically "accorded broad 
discretion in fashioning an appropriate decree." 
Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah 1982). 
We will affirm a trial court's exercise of that broad 
discretion unless it was abused. Id. 
\ 31 Owelty is a remedy sometimes awarded in 
conjunction with a partition order. When a partition 
cannot be made without "great prejudice" to a 
cotenant, the trial court, by statute, is permitted to 
order a sale of the property. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-39-1 (2002). Owelty is an equitable alternative 
to this often undesirable result. Under Utah Code 
section 78-39-41, a court can go forward with the 
partition and award owelty to a prejudiced party in 
order to compensate for any inequality suffered by 
that party. In the past, this court has expressed a 
preference that trial courts award owelty rather than 
forcing a sale. See Clawson v. Silver, 2001 UT 42, 
1fl[ 11, 12, 26 P.3d 209. We reemphasize this 
preference: "a public sale should be a last resort," 
especially in cases where "both [parties] desire to 
retain an interest" in the property to be partitioned. 
Id If 12. 
*7 Tf 32 Mayflower does not contest the trial 
court's actual physical division of the Partition 
Property. Rather, it challenges the owelty award, 
contending that the 4 Conditional Lots awarded by 
the trial court do not sufficiently compensate it for 
the prejudicial impact of the partition. Because 
Mayflower has failed to marshal the evidence 
supporting the owelty award, however, we cannot 
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. 
T| 33 The trial court undertook an intensive factual 
inquiry in determining the owelty award. Pursuant 
to section 78-39-41, the trial court was required to 
determine whether the partition could be made 
"equally among the parties ... without prejudice to 
the rights and interests of Mayflower. This was 
clearly a question of fact. See Clawson, 2001 UT 
42, If 10 ("Whether ... a partition can be made 
without great prejudice to the owners is a question 
of fact." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
If 34 The partition order entered by the trial court 
included the award of owelty in the form of the 4 
Conditional Lots that had been recommended by the 
Majority Report, thus reflecting the trial court's 
conclusion that an equal partition could not be 
achieved absent an award of some additional 
compensation to Mayflower. In reaching this 
conclusion, the trial court reviewed the voluminous 
record, which includes witness testimony, 
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transcripts of city meetings, and the Majority and 
Minority Reports, and concluded that Mayflower 
had failed to "present any evidence that the physical 
division of the Partition Property recommended by 
the [majority] referees is not fair or equitable." The 
trial court then had to "adjudge compensation" that 
would remedy any "inequality" resulting from the 
partition. Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-41. This task 
again required that the trial court survey the record 
and consider issues of fact. 
Tf 35 First, the trial court had to determine the 
extent of the inequality to be remedied by the 
owelty award. The court specifically focused on 
whether any density had been transferred from the 
Partition Property or the Mayflower Property to 
Mountain Village or the Northside Neighborhood. 
While the trial court apparently agreed with the 
Majority Report's conclusion that some density was 
"probably" transferred "from the [Partition Property 
and the Mayflower Property] and clustered into the 
Northside Neighborhood," it otherwise found that 
"no evidence was produced as a basis for 
[Mayflower's] claims for relief." Thus, like the 
drafters of the Majority Report, it was "convinced 
that the density in the Flagstaff Development gained 
from the [Partition Property] and from [the 
Mayflower Property] [was] limited to Mayflower's 
fair portion of the [Conditional Lots] in the 
Northside Neighborhood." 
K 36 In addition to considering evidence 
concerning the alleged density transfers, the trial 
court had to consider the amount of compensation 
necessary to achieve a fair and equitable partition. 
This again required that the trial court consider the 
evidence presented, including the recommendations 
and calculations in the Majority and Minority 
Reports. The trial court ultimately decided that it 
would be appropriate to award Mayflower 4 of the 
Conditional Lots in order to offset the inequality 
produced by the probable transfer of density to the 
Northside Neighborhood. 
*8 K 37 This examination of the issues of 
prejudice, inequality, and compensation 
undergirded the trial court's eventual exercise of its 
discretionary powers in fashioning the owelty 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
Page 8 of9 
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award. When parties appeal a court's fact-sensitive 
use of its discretionary powers, they "must 
successfully challenge the factual findings upon 
which the trial court's decision ... depended." Chen 
v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, n. 14, 100 P.3d 1177. This 
requires that parties marshal the evidence. As we 
have previously explained, parties who ask this 
court to consider fact-sensitive questions—including 
those questions reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard-have a duty to marshal all the 
evidence that formed the basis for the trial court's 
ruling. See id. (holding that parties had a duty to 
marshal the evidence when challenging the 
appointment of an interim CEO, a question 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard). 
If 38 We reaffirm the deliberate, clear instruction 
found in our prior decisions regarding the 
marshaling obligation and emphasize that the labels 
given particular issues by courts or counsel are not 
determinative. Rather, the critical element 
triggering the duty to marshal is factual inquiry. 
Parties seeking appellate review must marshal the 
evidence on those questions that require substantive 
factual inquiry, regardless of whether those 
questions are reviewed for clear error or abuse of 
discretion. Otherwise, this court will not question a 
lower court's factual analysis and will instead 
assume that the evidence supports the challenged 
findings. 
T[ 39 In challenging the owelty award, Mayflower 
had a duty to marshal all of the evidence supporting 
the award, including evidence relevant to the 
questions of inequality and appropriate 
compensation. Even if the challenged ruling did not 
specifically reference all such evidence, Mayflower 
was nevertheless required to present "every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings [it] resists." Id. ^ 77. 
This enables the reviewing court to evaluate 
fact-centric arguments in the context of the entire 
body of evidence. 
% 40 Mayflower has shirked that responsibility 
here. It has neither corralled the evidence 
supporting the compensation calculation of the trial 
court nor reviewed the evidence relating to the 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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alleged density transfers "in a light most favorable 
to the trial court." Id. ^ 78. Instead, Mayflower has 
cobbled together disjointed arguments and 
repeatedly highlighted and restated only that 
evidence favorable to its position. 
U 41 Because Mayflower has not properly 
challenged the factual basis underlying the owelty 
award, we cannot conclude that the trial court 
abused its discretion. We therefore affirm the trial 
court's award of owelty. 
III. ACCOUNTING 
% 42 Finally, Mayflower argues that the trial court 
erred by not requiring United Park to account for 
profits it received as a result of the annexation. We 
decline to analyze this claim on the ground that it is 
duplicative of Mayflower's claim for owelty. 
Indeed, the accounting claim hinges on the same 
familiar question of fact: whether the alleged 
transfers of density actually occurred. And the 
amount awarded under either remedy would be 
shaped by the same consideration: the benefits or 
profits received by United Park as a result of the 
alleged density transfers. 
*9 f 43 Furthermore, because the resolution of 
Mayflower's request for an accounting hinges on a 
question of fact, Mayflower has a corresponding 
duty to marshal the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings on that question. As explained 
above, Mayflower has failed to do so and therefore 
has not effectively demonstrated that the trial court 
erred in failing to order an accounting. 
CONCLUSION 
^ 44 Unless appellants marshal the evidence 
relevant to fact-dependent questions, they risk 
having their appeals rejected without consideration 
of those questions. Despite this frequently repeated 
counsel, parties sometimes attempt a second bite at 
the factual apple without first fulfilling this 
well-established duty. This tactic may be 
particularly appealing when a party attempts, as 
Mayflower has done here, to characterize the issues 
as issues of law that are not reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. The duty is not, 
however, contingent on labels and standards of 
review; it instead springs when an evaluation of the 
record is central to the task confronting the 
reviewing court. 
If 45 While this duty may seem to place appellants 
in the disadvantageous position of advocating the 
arguments they seek to rebut, it may often have the 
unexpected benefit of bolstering the cogency of the 
arguments they actually advance. Additionally, and 
more importantly, fairness and judicial economy 
compel us to vigorously enforce the threshold 
marshaling requirement found in rule 24(a)(9). 
Because Mayflower has not met this threshold, we 
must assume that the evidence supports the factual 
findings underlying the trial court's decision and 
therefore affirm. 
U 46 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief 
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT and Judge 
QUINN concur in Justice PARRISH'S opinion. 
If 47 Having disqualified himself, Justice 
NEHRING does not participate herein; District 
Court Judge ANTHONY B. QUINN sat. 
P.3d — , 2006 WL 1528607 (Utah), 2006 UT 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. 
SERUKATILIAIA, : CaseNo. 20041030-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from his convictions for murder, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004); aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily 
injury, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1 )(a) (West 2004); 
aggravated assault with use of a dangerous weapon, a third degree felony, in violation of 
section 76-5-103(l)(b); and obstruction of justice, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004) (pour-over provision). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly bar Marco Etsitty from testifying after defendant failed 
to disclose that Etsitty would be a defense witness, even though the defense had subpoenaed 
him weeks before trial? Alternatively, has defendant established that his counsel was 
ineffective for choosing not to designate Etsitty as a defense witness prior to trial? 
A trial court's decision to sanction a party's noncompliance with a pretrial discovery 
order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 413-414 
(1988) (recognizing a trial court's discretion to exclude a witness as a sanction for 
noncompliance with a discovery order); Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081,1084-85 (Utah App. 
1998) (same). See also State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, \ 8,76 P.3d 1165 (reviewing a trial 
court's exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion). 
When an allegation of ineffective counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, a 
defendant must prove as a matter of law that his trial counsel's performance "was deficient 
in that it 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,' and that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial.'" State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah 
App. 1993) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
2. Did the trial court correctly rule that a bystander's out-of-court statement to 
defense witness Isaac Martinez was inadmissible hearsay? 
"Although the admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law, [the appellate 
court] review[s] a trial court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence for an abuse of 
discretion." Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ^ 8. 
3. Did the prosecutor commit prejudicial misconduct when he summarized Lindsay 
Isakson's testimony during closing argument? 
A claim of error will be considered for the first time on appeal only if defendant 
establishes that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object and/or that the trial court 
plainly erred in sua sponte correcting the error. See State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, ^ 
2 
7-8, 36 P.3d 533. To establish plain error, defendant must show (1) that an error occurred, 
(2) the error was obvious, and (3) the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial. See State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993). To establish that his trial counsel was ineffective, 
defendant must show that his counsel's failure to act was both deficient and prejudicial. See 
Garrett, 849 P.2d at 579. 
4. Did the prosecutor commit prejudicial misconduct when he told the jurors in 
closing argument that they "were selected to be on this jury to act as the voice and conscience 
of the community" and opined that if the jurors "say to [defendant] that he is not guilty, it is 
as true to say that there has been no crime"? 
"On appeal from a denial of a motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, 
because the trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's impact on the 
proceedings, [the appellate court] will not reverse the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of 
discretion." State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993). "The test of whether the remarks 
made by counsel are so objectionable as to merit a reversal in the criminal case is, did the 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict, and were they, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, probably influenced by the remarks.'" State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 
(Utah 1984) (quoting State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973)). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are reproduced in Addendum A, together with any other 
provision cited in argument: 
3 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16 - Discovery; 
Utah R. Evid. 803 - Hearsay Exceptions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 22,2001, defendant was charged with the murder of Kehndra Isakson, the 
attempted murder or aggravated assault of Joe Valdez, the aggravated assault or simple 
assault of Shane Alvera, the simple assault of Lindsay Isakson, and obstruction of justice (R. 
18-22). The murder charges were subject to enhanced penalties based on defendant's use of 
a firearm (id.).1 
A jury trial was conducted on November 18-20 & 26, 2002 (R. 288-89, 295-98,386-
89). On November 26, 2002, the jury found defendant guilty of the murder of Kehndra 
Isakson, guilty of the aggravated assault of Joe Valdez, guilty of the aggravated assault of 
Shane Alvera, guilty of obstruction of justice, and not guilty of the assault of Lindsay Isakson 
(R. 371-75). The jury also found that defendant used a dangerous weapon in committing the 
crimes (R. 371-72). Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of five-
years-to-life for murder, one-to-fifteen years for second-degree aggravated assault, zero-to-
five years for third-degree aggravated assault, and one-to-fifteen years for obstruction of 
justice (R. 398-400). The judgment was formally entered on January 16, 2003 (id.). 
On January 24, 2003, defendant moved for a new trial on that grounds that one of 
defendant's co-defendants confessed to a jail inmate that he, not defendant, shot the victim 
(R. 404-08). A hearing was scheduled, but the inmate refused to testify (R. 468-69). On 
]Defendant was also charged with possession or use of a firearm by a restricted 
person, but that charge was dismissed following the verdicts in this case (R. 19-20, 220-
22, 290-94, 467). 
4 
November 1, 2004, the court denied the new trial motion because no evidence supported it 
(R. 468-69). A timely notice of appeal was filed on November 3, 2004 (R. 472).2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
Defendant had nothing against Kehndra Isakson (R507: 35). In fact, he did not even 
know her (id.). Nevertheless, he murdered her on September 29, 2001 (R. 371). 
The night began normally. Kehndra and her fiance, Joe Valdez, were at a friend's 
party in Kearns, Utah (R503: 108-12). About 50 friends were there, including Kehndra's 
little sister, Lindsey (R503: 115-16, 163-66). Some of the partygoers were drinking hard 
alcohol, but Joe had only one beer and Lindsay had nothing to drink before the trouble began 
(R503: 116-17,141-42,166). 
Defendant and his friends, Ezekiel House, Gustavo Roman, Isaac Martinez, and • 
Rafael (Last Name Unknown) arrived at the party around 10 or 11 p.m. (R504: 309-10; 
R505: 528). Joe and Kehndra did not know defendant, but Lindsay recognized him as a^  
friend's former boyfriend (R503: 155, 173-74). 
2Defendant does not challenge the denial of his motion for new trial, but includes 
the jail inmate's affidavit and a Legal Defender Association's interview in the addenda to 
his brief. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.], Addendum A. This Court should not consider 
these unsworn and unsubstantiated allegations. See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 
(UtahApp. 1998). 
3In his Statement of Facts, defendant ignores appellate standards and fails to folly 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's rulings or set forth the facts in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdicts. See State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, If 60, 28 P.3d 
1278. Consequently, as will be discussed infra, this Court should summarily refuse to 
consider several of his fact-dependent claims. See id. at % 61. 
5 
House started the trouble about 30 minutes later. House was playing craps (dice) in 
the kitchen with Dennis McGowan and some others (R503: 167-73; R504: 272). McGowan 
was winning, but decided to quit to rejoin his girlfriend (R504: 272). House got upset and 
McGowan told him that they could settle their argument "outside" (R504: 272-73). House 
responded, "F11 blast you right now if you want to trip" (R504:296-97). They began pushing 
each other (R503: 176; R504: 231-32, 272-73). McGowan testified, "We were in each 
other's face" (R504: 297). 
The two were ordered outside (R503: 176; R504: 273). Some girls pushed House 
towards the front door in the living room (R504: 297). As a small crowd gathered, House 
struck a ceiling lamp askew and hit one of the girls (R503: 177, 202-04; R504: 381-82). 
Lindsey tried to intervene, but House pushed her down and continued to hit the other girl 
(R503: 178, 204). Someone hit Lindsey on the back of her head (id.). When she turned, 
defendant was directly behind her (R503: 178, 209).4 
Kehndra yelled for Joe, who was in the basement (R503: 117-18). When he came 
upstairs, several partygoers surrounded defendant and two of his friends in the corner of the 
living room (R503: 123). Joe approached with the intention of fighting whoever had hit 
Lindsey and, he assumed, Kehndra (R503: 122-23, 144-45). Before Joe could swing, 
defendant pulled out a .25 caliber semi-automatic handgun from his waistband and fired it 
twice into the ceiling of the living room (R503: 124-26,179; R504: 234-35; R505: 501, 504-
4Because defendant was the closest person to her, Lindsay believed he had hit her, 
but admitted that she could not be positive since she did not see him (R503: 209). 
Defendant was acquitted of the assault (R. 375). 
6 
05, 511). Defendant then pointed the gun directly at Joe and Kehndra (R503: 124-28, 200, 
206; R504: 232-35). Joe was unarmed and immediately backed away (R503: 128,145,153-
54, 156-57, 206). He told defendant, "We don't need this" (R503: 128-29). 
Only 20 seconds elapsed between when Lindsay was hit on the head and defendant 
fired his gun (R503: 179). 
Defendant and his friends walked towards the front door as Joe and a few others 
followed (R503: 128-29; R504: 236). At the door, Lindsey heard a "black guy" say to 
defendant, "Give me the gun" (R503: 196-98). Defendant responded, "no, no" and ran out 
the front door with the .25 caliber gun still in his hand (R503: 182, 195-98, 213-214). The 
"black guy" who asked for gun "was still in the house" when defendant ran outside (R503: 
213-15; R505:516).5 
Kehndra, Lindsey, Joe, and Joe's friend, Shane Alvera, stood on the front porch and 
watched as defendant walked down the driveway on the east side of the house (R503: 130-
34, 181; R504: 236-37). Defendant walked only 10-15 feet down the driveway and then 
stopped close to the front sidewalk (R503: 134-35,182-83). See Exhibits 6 & 14. He turned 
5Defendant speculated to the jury that the "black guy" was House (R506: 720). No 
evidence supports this. Lindsey could not identify the person and there were lots of 
"black people" at the party (R503: 197; R505: 575). Moreover, while defendant draws 
only one inference from this statement, to wit, that the person asked for the gun to fire it, 
there is an equally reasonable inference: the person asked for the gun to prevent defendant 
from firing it again. See R503: 196-98, 200, 213-15; R505: 516, 518. In any case, 
defendant did not hand over the gun. 
7 
around and faced the porch (R503: 135). Defendant raised his gun, held it with both hands, 
and fired multiple times at the people on the porch (R503: 134-35, 185).6 
Only five to ten seconds elapsed between when defendant fired his gun in the living 
room and fired it again at the people on the porch (R503: 181). 
One bullet hit Kehndra in her chest (R503: 94-96,101-02). Kehndra screamed, "ow," 
and collapsed in Lindsey's arms (R503: 136,181,210). She died minutes later (R503: 136). 
Joe felt excruciating pain in his knee and realized he had been shot (R503: 138). Shane 
Alvera was shot in the wrist (R504: 237, 242-44). 
Joe watched defendant fire his gun at the porch (R503: 134-35,139,147-48). Joe saw 
the flash of fire from the first bullet, looked back at Kehndra, who was behind Joe, and then 
heard defendant fire three more times in rapid succession (R503: 147-48). Lindsey did not 
see the fire flashes, but knew it was defendant who fired because she watched him leave the 
house with the gun in his hand, walk to end of the driveway, turn, and aim the gun at the 
people on the porch (R503: 182-186, 213-215; R505: 511-13, 519-20).7 
6Defendant states that "someone" shot at the house. See Br.Aplt. at 9. This fails to 
fairly present the trial evidence—especially where defendant does not challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. 
7Defendant fails to view the evidence of his identification in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdicts and, instead, improperly argues alleged inconsistencies in 
the testimony and claims it was too dark to see. See Br.Aplt. at 7-9, 13-15 n.4 & 17-18. 
The record establishes that Joe identified the inside and outside shooter as the same 
person (R503: 125-28, 133-35, 139). Joe and defendant were only one or two feet apart 
in the living room and only ten or fifteen feet apart outside (id.). Joe positively picked 
defendant out of a photo spread (R504: 367-68). Lindsay knew defendant and easily 
identified him as the inside shooter (R503: 173-74, 179). Outside, she saw him point the 
gun at the victims (R503: 186, 190, 196-98, 213-15). Defendant told Isaac Martinez that 
he was the inside shooter and admitted to the police that he had his .25 caliber gun with 
8 
McGowan also saw defendant fire at the victims. Just after his argument with House, 
McGowan heard that "someone" had a gun and decided to leave (R504: 298). He left the 
house through the garage, walked into the front yard, and heard shots from inside the house 
(R504: 274-75). A few seconds later, he heard at least ten more shots from outside (R504: 
279, 282, 291, 298). At trial, he claimed he never saw the shooter (id.). On cross-
examination, he admitted that he previously told the police that five seconds after he heard 
the shots from inside the house, he saw defendant and his friends run out of the house into 
the front yard (R504: 282). Defendant was carrying something small and dark in his hand 
(R504: 283). Though McGowan made several contradictory statements to the police, he 
ultimately admitted in a police interview that he saw defendant fire multiple times at the 
people on the porch, but was afraid that he would be killed if he was labeled a "snitch" 
(R504: 299-304, 350-57, 394-405, 409-10).8 
Isaac Martinez came to the party with defendant and testified for the defense at trial 
(R505:528). Martinez climbed through abasement window into the backyard when he heard 
him at the party (R504: 436; R505: 541-42). After the party, defendant still had the gun 
until he and House threw it in the river (R504: 313,315-16). Because defendant does not 
challenge the sufficiency of this evidence to convict him, it is improper for him to 
minimize it. 
8Defendant represents that McGowan 5s identification of defendant is the result of 
police coercion and misconduct. See Br,Aplt.. at 10-13. The detective who interviewed 
McGowan denied this. He explained that McGowan was afraid that he might be killed if 
he identified defendant, but nevertheless admitted that he saw defendant shoot the victims 
over the course of several interviews (R504: 300-304, 350-57, 394-405, 407-10). During 
trial, McGowan attempted to recant his prior identification of defendant (R504: 280-300). 
When it became obvious that his recantation was a lie, the trial court excused the jury, 
warned McGowan that he could be charged with perjury, and advised him of his right to 
counsel (R504: 301). 
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the "fighting upstairs" (R505: 538). While still in the backyard, he heard two shots; he then 
jumped the fence into the front yard and heard more shots coming from the direction of the 
garage (R505: 538-40). As he ran away, he saw defendant running from the house, but still 
heard a couple shots (R505: 534-35). Martinez said he did not know if defendant was armed, 
but then acknowledged that defendant admitted to him that he fired his gun inside the house 
(R505: 533, 540-41). According to Martinez, House and Rafael also had guns at the party, 
but did not use them (R505: 533, 535, 539). Martinez insisted that he did not know who shot 
the victims (R505: 535, 539).9 
Steven Butler also left the house when the first shots were fired (R505: 571). He 
stopped in the front yard on the west side of the house, which on the other side of the house 
from the driveway on the east (R505: 571). See Exhibit 53. As people streamed from the 
house, he heard more shots fired outside (R505: 571-72). Butler kneeled down on the lawn 
about 20-25 feet northwest from the front door and tried to find his friend among those 
fleeing the house (R505: 573-74). As he moved a bit closer to the house, he saw the flash 
ofgun fire in his peripheral vision, about 10-15 feet to his left (R505: 573-575, 583-89). See 
Exhibit 53. The shooter was black with poofy hair and stood at a different location in the 
yard than where Joe and Lindsey placed defendant (R503: 254-55; R505: 576-583). 
Compare Exhibits 6, 14, & 53. Butler testified that shots were coming "from all around" for 
9Defendant suggests that his admission to Martinez is hearsay and, therefore, less 
credible. See Br.Aplt. at 20. By definition, a party's admission is not hearsay. See Utah 
R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (Add. A). 
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30-45 seconds (R505: 588-90). Butler thought the shots sounded like they were from 
different caliber guns. 
When the shooting stopped, defendant, House, Raphael, and their friends fled the 
scene (R504: 309-10). They drove to Raphael's house in Chesterfield near the Jordan River 
(R504: 11). Defendant still had his gun with him (R504: 313, 315-16). Defendant gave the 
gun to House, who wiped off any fingerprints and placed the gun in a bag with at least one 
other gun (R504: 314-17,380). The group then walked to the river and House threw the bag 
of guns into the water (id.). 
Two weeks later, one of the group—Gustavo Roman—told the police about the guns 
and took them to the spot where House had thrown the bag into the river (R504: 317, 375-
75). A nine-millimeter gun and a .25 caliber magazine were recovered, but the police did not 
find defendant's .25 caliber semi-automatic gun (R504: 376-77, 388-89).10 
When the police inspected the murder scene, they found numerous nine-millimeter 
spent casings near the location where Butler saw the second shooter and also found nine-
millimeter bullets in the eaves of the home (R505: 608-19).u 
10Defendant implies that the police just happened to find these items. See Br.Aplt. 
at 19. He omits that Roman cooperated with the police and brought them to the exact 
location where the guns were thrown into the river (R504: 317). 
llDefendant asserts that the nine millimeter casings were "not located anywhere 
near where the eyewitnesses testified the fatal shooter was standing/running." See 
Br.Aplt. at 18. This is true, but defendant ignores the fair inference of this testimony: 
defendant shot the victims with a .25 caliber gun; a second shooter shot at the house with 
a nine-millimeter gun. 
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The police located one fired .25 caliber shell casing in the living room carpet and a 
bullet hole in the living room ceiling (R504: 328-332, 340-41). They discovered two spent 
.25 caliber shell casings outside, near the driveway, in the location where Joe and Lindsey 
placed defendant (R504: 333-37). The spent .25 casing found in the living room and the two 
spent .25 casings found outside were fired from the same gun (R504: 423-25). 
A .25 caliber bullet was removed from Kehndra's chest (R504: 348-49). A .25 caliber 
bullet was removed from Shane Alvera's wrist (R504: 348-49, 378-79). The bullet which 
struck Joe could not be removed without further damaging his knee (R503:139). The bullets 
removed from Kehndra and Shane were fired from the same .25 caliber gun (R504: 425-26). 
But without the gun itself, the state firearms expert could not positively match the spent 
casings found at the scene with the bullets removed from the victims, other than to identify 
them as all being the same caliber (R504: 426). Though the gun was never recovered, 
defendant admitted that he brought a .25 caliber semi-automatic gun to the party (R504:436). 
Additional facts relevant to individual points will be discussed in the argument portion 
of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 
convictions. Nevertheless, he claims that his otherwise valid convictions should be vacated 
because the trial court, his trial counsel, and the prosecutor committed prejudicial errors. 
This Court need not consider the merits of several of defendant's arguments because he fails 
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to marshal the evidence upon which the arguments are necessarily based. Even if the merits 
are considered, no error occurred. 
Exclusion of Marco Etsitty. Defendant does not dispute that a trial court may 
sanction a party's noncompliance with a discovery order by excluding a witness. Defendant 
claims only that here, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding defense witness Marco 
Etsitty. Because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
ruling, this Court should summarily reject defendant's claim of error. Even if the merits are 
considered, the record supports the trial court's actions. 
Below, defense counsel conceded that she failed to disclose multiple defense 
witnesses prior to trial, but claimed her noncompliance with the pretrial discovery order was 
excusable because she had not decided to call the witnesses until mid-trial. The trial court 
rejected this explanation as it related to Marco Etsitty because the defense subpoenaed him 
weeks before trial. The court found that defense counsel deliberately chose not to disclose 
Etsitty pretrial and sanctioned the noncompliance by barring Etsitty' s testimony. At the same 
time, the court accepted defense counsel's explanations regarding the delayed disclosure of 
other witnesses and did not bar their testimony. Given the circumstances of this case, the 
trial court acted within its discretion. 
Alternatively, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in choosing not 
to disclose that Etsitty would be a defense witness. Defendant fails to carry his burden of 
establishing a Sixth Amendment violation. 
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When the trial court sanctioned defense counsel, it subjectively judged only the 
credibility of counsel's explanations. But to establish that counsel was ineffective, defendant 
must affirmatively establish both that the conduct of his counsel was objectively 
unreasonable and that but for his counsel's conduct, the outcome of his trial would have been 
different. Here, defendant's ineffectiveness claim may be easily rejected for lack of 
prejudice—Etsitty's testimony was cumulative of other undisputed testimony and, therefore, 
whether permitted or not, the outcome of the trial would be the same. Consequently, this 
Court need not resolve whether his counsel's conduct was also deficient. 
Exclusion of Hearsay. The trial court ruled that defense witness Isaac Martinez 
could not testify to what a bystander told him he observed. Though the bystander spoke in 
an excited tone when he spoke to Martinez, the bystander's out-of-court description of what 
he observed during of the shooting did not constitute an excited utterance pursuant to rule 
803(2), Utah Rules of Evidence. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled the statement 
inadmissible. This Court need not reach the merits of defendant's claim, however, because 
he failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling. 
Closing Argument - Alleged Misstatement of Evidence. During closing argument, 
the prosecutor summarized Lindsey Isakson's testimony. The prosecutor said that when 
defendant exited the front door, a "black man" ask him for his gun, defendant refused, and 
defendant went in a "completely opposite direction" from the "black man." Defendant raised 
no objection to the prosecutor's statement. 
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For the first time on appeal, defendant claims that the prosecutor misrepresented 
Lindsey's testimony. Consequently, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the statement and the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte correcting it. Both 
claims fail, however, because no error occurred. The prosecutor fairly represented Lindsey's 
testimony and properly argued its fair inferences. 
Closing Argument—Alleged Appeal to Emotion. At the conclusion of the 
prosecutor's closing argument, defendant objected to the prosecutor reminding the jury that 
they "were selected to be on this jury to act as the voice and conscience of the community." 
The trial court initially ruled the objection untimely, but then properly overruled the 
objection because the prosecutor simply restated what the court itself told the jury. The 
court's conclusion is consistent with the majority view. 
Defendant also objected when the prosecutor opined that "if you [the jury] say to 
[defendant] that he is not guilty, it is as true to say that there has been no crime." The 
prosecutor's statement was made in response to defendant's argument that a not guilty 
verdict could mean different things. Because defendant fails to marshal the facts surrounding 
the statement, this Court may summarily reject his claim of error. If the merits are 
considered, the trial court correctly viewed the prosecutor's statement as legitimate 
responsive argument. The court also correctly noted that no prejudice resulted from the 





THE TRIAL COURT PERMISSIBLY BARRED ETSITTY FROM 
TESTIFYING BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO COMPLY 
WITH THE PRETRIAL DISCOVERY; ALTERNATIVELY, 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT HIS COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE IN CHOOSING NOT TO DESIGNATE ETSITTY AS A 
WITNESS PRIOR TO TRIAL 
The trial court ordered the parties to exchange witness lists at least ten days prior to 
trial (R. 121, 202-04). The defense submitted a list of some 15 trial witnesses (R.218-19). 
After the prosecution presented its case-in-chief, the defense informed the court that it would 
be calling only two of its designated witnesses and planned on calling multiple persons who 
were not formally designated as trial witnesses by either party. (R504: 442-44, 447). The 
prosecutor objected (R505: 459). After extensive discussions, the trial court rejected 
counsel's explanation in regards to one proposed witness, Marco Etsitty, and refused to allow 
him to testify (R505: 468, 475-77). The court allowed defendant to call the other proposed 
witnesses (id.). See Addendum B (Argument & Ruling Excluding Marco Etsitty). 
Defendant now claims the court erred in finding that his counsel chose not to comply 
with the discovery order and abused its discretion in excluding Etsitty. See Br.Aplt. at 27-3 5. 
The Court need not reach the merits of defendant's claim because he has not marshaled the 
evidence in support of the trial court's ruling. See State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, fflf 60-61, 
12The State responses to defendant's Point I and 11(A). 
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28 P.3d 1278. If the merits are considered, the record supports the trial court's factual 
findings and ruling. 
Alternatively, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in choosing not 
to disclose Etsitty as a witness prior to trial. See Br.Aplt. at 35-38. Defendant ignores, 
however, the high burden he bears in alleging ineffectiveness of counsel. Not only must he 
establish that his counsel's strategic choice was deficient, he must also show that absent the 
choice, the outcome of the trial would have been different. See State v. Kooyman, 2005 UT 
App 222, f 30, 112 P.3d 1252. Because defendant fails to establish either prong, his 
argument necessarily fails. See id. 
A. The Merits of Defendant's Claim Should Not Be Considered Because 
Defendant Fails to Marshal the Facts in Support of the Trial Court's 
Findings and Ruling. 
Before a defendant may attack a trial court's ruling, he must marshal the evidence 
which supports it. See ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). Rearguing facts based on "selective excerpts 
of the record" does not satisfy the marshaling requirement. Id. "Instead, [a defendant] must 
first marshal all the evidence in support of the [challenged] finding and then demonstrate that 
the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in the light 
most favorable to the court below." Id. Accord Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f^ 60. Moreover, 
when a factual finding is predicated on an assessment of credibility, a trial court must be 
allowed to draw "its own conclusions." See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,314 (Utah 
1998). 
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Here, defendant fails to marshal the facts which support the finding that his counsel 
chose not to timely disclose that Etsitty would be a defense witness. Defendant also does not 
marshal the facts which support the trial court's decision to impose a sanction. 
Consequently, this Court may, summarily refuse to consider defendant's claim of error. See 
Widdison, 2001 UT 60, fflf 60-61. 
A review of the discovery procedure reveals defendant's failure to marshal. 
Defendant does not acknowledge that the trial court entered a formal order of 
discovery months before trial. See Br.Aplt. at 21 -24 & 30-34. The marshaled facts establish 
that defendant requested and received extensive pretrial discovery from the prosecution (R. 
11-12, R. 23, 25-30, 32, 38-40, 41, 43, 45, 49-50, 52-53, 55-56, 58, 60, 62, 64). The 
discovery included the names of over 100 potential witnesses, along with reports, transcripts, 
and/or audiotapes of police interviews of at least 60 of those individuals, including Marco 
Etsitty (id.). 
More than six months before trial, the prosecution requested the names of defendant's 
trial witnesses and any reports of their anticipated testimony (R. 99-100,102-07). Defendant 
did not object. On April 17, 2002, the trial court ordered defendant to timely provide the 
prosecutor with the names of the defense trial witnesses and reminded defense counsel of her 
ethical duty to update any witness information (R. 121). 
The marshaled facts establish that two months after the court initially ordered 
reciprocal discovery of trial witnesses, defendant filed a reply opposing it (R. 140-55). 
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Defense counsel insisted even if the court ordered it, a defense trial witness list could not be 
provided prior to trial: 
In regard to the State's request, a list of witnesses the defense intends to call 
at trial and the addresses, phone numbers, and dates of birth of those witnesses, 
the defendant states that he will not decide who to call as witnesses until he 
has first heard the testimony of the state's witnesses. This is much the same 
decision-making process the prosecutor goes through in deciding what 
witnesses to call in rebuttal to the defense case. That decision cannot be made 
until after the opposing party's witnesses have testified. The defendant, 
therefore, cannot comply with the state's request, even if so ordered by the 
court, until the close of the state's case-in-chief. 
(R. 142). The prosecutor filed a second memorandum in support of its prior discovery 
request (R. 188-93). On August 2, 2002, the trial court entered a second order directing 
defendant to provide a list of the defense trial witnesses and defense trial exhibits (R. 202-
04). Defendant acknowledges none of these facts. See Br.Aplt. at 21-24 & 30-34. 
On September 24, 2002, the prosecutor provided defendant with a list of its trial 
witnesses and exhibits (R. 207-11). On September 27,2002, defendant provided a list of 15 
defense witnesses, reserving the right to call additional witnesses (R. 218-19). Marco Etsitty 
was not listed as a trial witness by either party. 
The marshaled facts establish that on October 7, 2002, the trial court again ordered 
the parties to exchange final trial witness lists before November 7,2002, which was less than 
ten days before the scheduled trial (R. 235-36, 239-40). 
On October 22 or 25,2002, defendant interviewed Marco Etsitty and served him with 
a subpoena to appear for trial on November 18th (R. 255; R505: 467). Defense counsel did 
19 
not amend her previously filed witness list to include Etsitty or otherwise disclose that the 
defense intended to call Etsitty as a trial witness. 
The week before trial, the prosecutor asked defense counsel to provide an updated list 
of witnesses after defense counsel casually mentioned that she might call witnesses who were 
not on her witness list (R505: 468). Defendant did not update her witness list or otherwise 
disclose the identity of the undesignated witnesses prior to trial. Defendant fails to marshal 
these facts. See Br.Aplt. at 21-24 & 30-34. 
At trial, in its case-in-chief, the prosecution presented evidence implicating only 
defendant; no evidence was introduced of a second shooter, who fired at the house with a 
different caliber gun, but did not hit anyone. See Statement of Facts, supra. After the 
prosecution rested, defense counsel for the first time informed the court that she intended to 
call only two of the 15 witnesses on her witness list and in addition would call numerous 
undesignated witnesses (R505: 442-53). The prosecutor specifically objected to the defense 
calling Marco Etsitty, Adrien Lewis, Aaron Zippro, and Stephen Butler, none of whom had 
been listed as trial witnesses (R. 307-17; R505: 459-60). 
After lengthy discussions over two days, the trial court found that defense counsel had 
intentionally chosen not to designate Etisitty as a witness, even though counsel had 
interviewed and subpoenaed Etsitty weeks before trial (R505: 468, 471, 476-77, 480). See 
Addendum B (Argument and Ruling Excluding Etsitty). The court concluded that exclusion 
of Etisitty 5s testimony was an appropriate sanction (id.). 
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In reaching this decision, the court considered several facts, none of which are 
marshaled by defendant. See Br.Aplt. at 23-24. The court noted that defendant's original 
witness list appeared to have little meaning in that the defense intended to call only two of 
the 15 listed witnesses (R505: 447-48). The court noted that over 150 potential witnesses 
were involved in the case, which required counsel to responsibly pare down its potential trial 
witnesses (R505: 471-72). For the same reason, the mere fact that the police may have 
interviewed Etsitty—along with the other potential 150 witnesses—a year before trial, did 
not provide the prosecution with reasonable notice that the defense would call him as a trial 
witness (R505: 471-73). 
Defendant also does not marshal the court's credibility findings. Defendant claims 
that the only reason the court gave for finding that his counsel intentionally omitted Etsitty, 
was that defense counsel provided such "excellent representation." See Br.Aplt. at 30. 
Defendant states that the "trial court did not make any finding that the defense lied about the 
matter or wilfully violated the requirement to disclose witnesses, or that they willfully 
omitted to disclose in an effort to obtain some tactical advantage." See Br.Aplt. at 30. The 
marshaled facts are otherwise. 
The trial court clearly and repeatedly stated that defense counsel's non-disclosure 
reflected on the integrity of the court and called into question the professional and ethical 
conduct of counsel: 
COURT: But I find it extremely unprofessional that tapes are provided are not 
listened to by both sides or reviewed or viewed by both sides. That witness 
lists are not pared down. And that a witness list that's accurate is not provided 
to the other side. What it amounts to is it sounds like preparation for the trial 
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was done the weekend before trial and that by the time of the pretrial back in 
early November, none of these decisions had been made. And now you're 
asking me to allow the witnesses to testify. 
(R504: 448). The court continued to probe defense counsel: 
COURT: When did you make the decision to call the witnesses that you just 
told me about? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Some of them we've made just this week, Judge. In 
fact some of them were subpoenaed this week. 
COURT: When did you make the decision to call these witnesses? 
COUNSEL: I'll have to check the subpoenas, Judge. 
COURT: Some of them you knew about before trial and did not disclose to the 
other side; is that correct? 
COUNSEL: Some of them we anticipated possibly calling today or tomorrow 
when we put on our case, but -
COURT: I'm not getting an answer. . . 
(R504: 449). The court summarized its initial feelings and continued to question counsel: 
COURT: I'm aware that there are about a hundred different witnesses that 
could have been called. I still don't understand why you did not notify the 
State of who you intended to call out of the long list. And I think it's - I'll 
probably allow the witnesses to testify because great latitude is given to 
defendants in criminal cases, but I'll be honest with you, this is unprofessional 
in my opinion. And I have real problems with a nondisclosure of witnesses. 
And I have hard time understanding why you did not advise the State of 
changes in your plans. And I can't believe that you made all the changes 
today. When did you send out your subpoenas for these witnesses? 
COUNSEL: They were sent out at different times, Judge, and I can't answer 
at this time. 
COURT: I'm not getting an answer I guess. . . . Do you have copies of what 
you sent out? 
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COUNSEL: I'm sure we do. I don't have them with me here today. 
COURT: Well, let me suggest you better get them because I want to know at 
what point you made the decision and whether or not there was an opportunity 
to tell the State. . . . [A] criminal trial is not supposed to be a game of hide the 
ball. 
(R504: 450-51). See Add. B. 
The court continued to question counsel the next morning after the prosecutor 
discovered that Etsitty had been subpoenaed by the defense weeks before trial (R505: 459-
475). Ultimately, the court barred Etsitty from testifying: 
COURT: . . . I'm going to exclude the witness's testimony. As I said 
yesterday, I'm not only concerned about the defendant getting a fair trial, I'm 
also concerned about what is appropriate conduct by counsel. And in this case 
I'm not going to condone the fact that a witness was subpoenaed on October 
25th and not - the State was not notified of that until the middle of trial. I have 
some grave concerns about it. And it appears that the case cited by the 
prosecution, Taylor versus Illinois, is directly on point. Mr. Etsitty will not 
be testifying. 
(R505: 468). The court further clarified that the basis of its decision was "the fact that the 
subpoena went out on Mr. Etsitty on October 25th, which indicates clearly that the defense 
knew they would be calling this witness" (R505: 471). 
The discussion continued (R505: 471-74). The court was still not satisfied with 
counsel's explanations: "I'd like to hear why you haven't disclosed these names. I've never 
gotten an adequate explanation to that. Give me a good reason" (R505: 474). Counsel 
suggested that the subpoena meant little because the defense had subpoenaed several 
witnesses who they now had decided not to call (id.). The court questioned this 
representation: 
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COURT: Let me see if I understand what you're saying because it's not 
making a great deal of sense to me. Are you saying that you didn't decide who 
to call until the middle of trial? . . . 
COUNSEL: I'm saying some of the witnesses we did not decide to call until 
the State had put on their case. 
COURT: Okay. And that certainly could not be true of Mr. Etsitty. 
(R505: 474-75). After further discussion, the court entered its ruling, from which defendant 
cites only parsed phrases: 
COURT: . . . I am relying on the case [Taylor] cited. I am also relying on 
basic principles of equity and the fact that this is not a run-of-the-mill trial. 
. . . my observation is that the defense has been extremely well-prepared, they 
have had their questioning and their total preparation very well handled, 
indicated that they have known all along how they wanted to try this case. 
This is not a case where the defense has not made a good showing in terms of 
representation of their client. On the contrary, we've had a display from the 
defense of excellent representation. And consequently, I cannot find that this 
was an error or just an omission on the part of the defense. There's very 
careful preparation that's occurred here, show by the excellent performance of 
counsel. That it appears that it was a choice, especially since Mr. Etsitty, as 
indicated, was subpoenaed as long ago as October 25th. And I'm assuming that 
he was talked to by the defense on or about that time or prior to that time since 
certainly one would not call a witness one has not talked to. 
Again, I'm leaving open the question of whether Mr. Zippro and Mr. 
Butler can testify if they show up and the State has an opportunity to take to 
them an hour before they testify, they may be allowed to go forward. 
(R505:477). See Add. B. 
In sum, because defendant fails to properly marshal the supporting facts, his claim of 
error should be summarily rejected. See Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^ j 60-61. If the merits are 
considered, the record supports that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. 
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B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion In Barring Etsitty From 
Testifying. 
Defendant claims that the trial court had no basis to find that his counsel wilfully 
failed to comply with the discovery order and that without a wilful violation, the court abused 
its discretion in imposing witness exclusion as a sanction. See Br.Aplt. at 30-32. The claim 
is without factual or legal support. 
The trial court cited Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) as "directly on point" and 
the basis of its decision to sanction counsel (R505: 468 & 476-77). The court was correct. 
In Taylor, the prosecutor filed a motion seeking pretrial disclosure of defense 
witnesses. 484 U.S. at 403. Taylor's defense counsel disclosed some witnesses, but on the 
first day of trial, amended his list to include other witnesses. Id. On the second day of trial, 
after the prosecutor's main witnesses had finished testifying, Taylor's counsel again 
attempted to amend the witness list by including two witnesses, whose materiality he claimed 
he had just discovered. Id. at 403-04. But upon further inquiry, the credibility of counsel's 
representation was called into question and ultimately, the trial court determined that counsel 
had interviewed one of the witnesses prior to trial, but had intentionally chosen not to 
designate as a witness until mid-trial. Id. at 404-05. The trial court sanctioned counsel by 
barring the witness from testifying. Id. at 405. 
The United States Supreme Court concluded that exclusion of a criminal defense 
witness "is not absolutely prohibited by the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment" and was justified in Taylor's case. Id. at 402. 
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The adversary process could not function without adherence to rules of 
procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and arguments to 
provide each party with a fair opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to 
contradict or explain the opponent's case. The trial process would be in 
shambles if either party had an absolute right to control the time and content 
of his witnesses' testimony. . . . The defendant's right to compulsory process 
is itself designed to vindicate the principle that the "ends of justice would be 
defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative 
presentation of the evidence." [Citation omitted.] Rules that provide for 
pretrial discovery of an opponent's witnesses serve the same high purpose. 
Discovery, like cross-examination, minimizes the risk that a judgment will be 
predicated on incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated 
testimony. The "State's interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour 
defense is merely one component of the broader public interest in a full and 
truthful disclosure of critical facts. 
Id. at 411-12. The Court held that a trial judge could demand an explanation of defense 
counsel for counsel's noncompliance with a pretrial discovery order and "[i]If that 
explanation reveals that the omission was wilful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical 
advantage . . . it would be entirely consistent [with constitutional principles] to exclude the 
witness' testimony." Id. at 415. 
One of the purposes of the discovery rule itself is to minimize the risk that 
fabricated testimony will be believed. Defendants who are willing to fabricate 
a defense may also be willing to fabricate excuses for failing to comply with 
a discovery requirement A dishonest client can mislead an honest attorney, 
and there are occasions when an attorney assumes that the duty of loyalty to 
the client outweighs elementary obligations to the court. 
Id. at 413-14. 
In this case, the trial court correctly concluded that defense counsel's actions fell 
squarely within Taylor, Nevertheless, defendant attempts to distinguish Taylor on the 
ground that the prosecutor in Taylor had no prior knowledge of the content of the challenged 
witnesses' anticipated testimony. See Br.Aplt. at 33. This is a distinction without meaning 
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here. As the trial court properly recognized, the mere fact that Etsitty was previously 
interviewed by the police lost significance when the interview was only one of i 51 potential 
w itne^ JI^ .M--* i . i} -M 4-M-" ' | /\ dditionalb - as defendant concedes see 
Br.Aplt. at 22 n.8, Etsitty's claim of being threatening was not included in his police 
interview, but constituted new information (R505: 486). 
Defendant also argues that 1 oj 'lot oiil> pen n lits the sa notion of exclusion if a pai ty 
wilfully fails to comply with a discovery order, which defendant claims the trial court did not 
find here. See Br.Aplt. at 29-30. Again, the claim is without merit. 
ri ne ucicrminai-oii . a\ ivi Li.at counsel acie,; r.i :a..iiiL: to comply w an 
the discovery order involves nearly identical, but less egregious, facts than those in this case: 
Taylor's counsel interviewed the challenged witness days only a week before trial; here, 
defendant's counsel interviewed and subpoenaed Etsitty weeks beloiv trial. Set JULIUUI 
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finding that "depends primarily on whether the district court accepts or rejects counsel's 
explanation as to why he could not provide notice" of his witnesses. United States v. Levy-
Defendant also argues that wilfulness cannot be found where he did not "hide" Etsitty, 
but simply failed to announce his defense until after the prosecution had rested. See Br.Aplt. 
it- u a t o ^U[ '1U1) - i - t ' . i ! uH : I i. : | C C l U l Mii> Uia iL tLU ' I I / a l n HI 
of counsel's actions: 
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Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant as a matter of 
constitutional right to await the end of the State's case before announcing the 
nature of his defense, any more than it entitles him to await the jury's verdict 
on the State's case-in-chief before deciding whether or not to take the stand 
himself. 
484 U.S. at 416 n.21 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accord Michigan v. 
Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1991) (recognizing that "a criminal trial is not ca poker game in 
which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their hands until played'") (citation 
omitted). 
Defendant argues that exclusion is too severe a sanction here because Etsitty's 
testimony was determinative of the outcome of his trial. SeeBr.Aplt. at 33-35. Based on the 
other record evidence, this is not true. Etsitty's proffered testimony was cumulative of 
Butler's actual testimony that a black man standing in the front yard shot at the house. 
Compare R505: 465-66 & 478-80, with R505: 570-92. This fact was not in dispute nor was 
it determinative of defendant's guilt—especially when Etsitty did not know where defendant 
was at the time of the shooting. See also Statement of Facts, supra. 
Finally, defendant argues that exclusion is too harsh a sanction where no prejudice 
would have resulted if Etsitty had been allowed to testify. SeeBr.Aplt. at 33-35. This ignores 
the prosecutor's claim of prejudice below (R505: 472-73). Moreover, m Taylor and other 
cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that exclusion of a witness is an appropriate 
sanction "' regardless of whether prejudice to the prosecution could have been avoided by a 
lesser penalty," because noncompliance with a court order impacts the very integrity of the 
court itself. See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 152 (quoting Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417). 
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C, llternatively, Defendant Has Not Established that His Counsel Was 
Ineffective. 
AltcniiiLiw.; J / .:-u Jaim- ••..•. - ->io w . 0 - 0 I V i n y 
violated his right to effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment. See Br.Aplt. at 37-38. 
Without analysis, defendant summarily assumes that because the trial court subjectively 
rejected u^ ^rcair; l i v , ,icrense counsel's explanations, counsel's actions cannot be 
reaM'ii *h!e an ' * K~ p.r Vial AVv \f. Vhc aivumen! snores the standards applicable 
to an ineffectiveness claim raised under to the Sixth Amendment.13 
When the lii.r court sanctioned counsel, the court did not consider what other 
deference or presumption of correctness. The court simply detemiined that counsel had not 
complied with the court's discovery order, judged the credibility of counsel's explanations 
in liglii .*! \A\ : • i.i.i- • Mght. ai u -LIPUV^ ly determined that counsel's explanations 
were credible as to some witnesses, but not credible in connection with Etsitty. See 
discussion, supra. Entirely different analytical standards apply in to a Sixth Amendment 
claim. . 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to "reasonably 
effective" counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Sixth 
Amendment docs aep,aa . ..; jeien.-u counsel make me : -M or rc.-i cnuiees, i-aPv mat 
Moreover, defendant cites State v. Smith, 2003 U I App 52, 65 P.3d 648, as 
controlling authority, see Br.Aplt. at 36-37, but the ineffectiveness holding in that case 
was reversed on certiorari. See State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ^ 21, 122 P.3d 615. 
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counsel make objectively reasonable choices" based "on the facts of the particular case, 
viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477'-79 
(2000). Indeed, "[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be 
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the 
time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
In sum, the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee that defendant's counsel will be of 
high quality, it guarantees that defendant's trial will be fair: 
[The United States Supreme Court has] consistently declined to impose 
mechanical rules on counsel—even when those rules might lead to better 
representation—not simply out of deference to strategic choices, but because 
"the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is 
not to improve the quality of legal representation, . . . but rather simply to 
ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." 
Roe, 528 U.S. at 481 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 
Consequently, to establish a Sixth Amendment violation, defendant must first 
demonstrate that his "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Accord State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ^ 38, 122 
P.3d 543. The issue is not whether trial counsel should or could have done something more. 
It is whether defendant has proven that no reasonable attorney would have done what his trial 
counsel did. See Roe, 528 U.S. at 478-79. In particular, defendant must establish facts that 
"overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). Accord Roe, 528 U.S. at 477 & 482; Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 38. 
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This Court need not resolve the deficiency issue, however, because defendant fails to 
establish prejudice, the second requirement of constitutional metlcctiveness. Sec hooyman, 
2005 [ I I \ p p 222, 1] 30 (i • ;cogni/in$: ' • vi< 'U"i.-\ P . ng nr *.; >t - • ..Mre^cd, if 
defendant cannot establish prejudice). Here, defendant claims only that his counsel 
committed "attorney error"; consequently, he must establish that actual prejudice resulted 
fron l tl le alleged en oi S ee Roe, 528 1 1.S. at 482-483 (citing i ' nited, S tates i :'" C / < : nic %6 
U.S. 648, 659 & n.26 (1984)). In other words, defendant is required to show that but for his 
counsel's failure to list Etsitty as a witness, Etsitty would have testified such that the outcome 
ofdeiciiuan; • .- , ... , ' I 'C.M :;!>u.::l. L>ueik;aiiL - • •. i . .:.... 
Below, defense counsel admitted that the defense had subpoenaed many witnesses 
whom the defense had decided not to call (R505: 474). Counsel admitted that even though 
t:ic vk i.nse was to i-egin ;N case in minutes, it was still 'juggling witnesses and trying to 
devidr ^ ho w r"iv <ioiiv i<. :"a s witnesses (R^Ov 4~"M ! t \\\ .ind:i\ oil . i "nded^n-^-d 
witnesses had been subpoenaed for the morning, but counsel stated that only Zippro and 
Butler had shown up so f ai . KM)?: 4. > (>}. Zippro was reluctant to testify and, ultimately, 
sum, fii this record, it is -mclcar if IZlsittx would ha\e (a; shown up, and (b) lestified. 
Moreover, it Lisitu nad testified, his testimony was cumulative oi Butici s. See 
i iiscus. sion, supra at 28. In i idition Etsitt;; - 's testimoi \y • i i i i lot exel i ide defendant as the 
murderer. See id. Consequently, inclusion of the testimony would have changed the 
outcome of the trial. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT ISAAC 
MARTINEZ COULD NOT TESTIFY TO WHAT A BYSTANDER 
TOLD HIM ABOUT THE SHOOTING 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that a bystander's out-of-court 
statement to Isaac Martinez was inadmissible hearsay. See Br.Aplt. at 40-43. Defendant 
argues that because the bystander discussed the shooting, the statement constituted an excited 
utterance under rule 803(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, and was admissible as an exception to 
the hearsay rule. See id. This Court need not reach the merits of defendant's claim because 
he fails to properly marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling. See Widdison, 
2001 UT 60, Yi 60-61. Even if the merits are considered, the ruling is correct. 
A. The Merits of Defendant's Claim Should Not Be Considered Because 
Defendant Has Failed to Marshal the Facts Supporting the Trial Court's 
Decision. 
In determining whether an out-of-court statement constitutes an excited utterance, a 
court must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the 
statement, including the event observed, the time between the event and the statement, the 
age and capacity of the person making the statement, and the nature of the statement itself. 
See discussion, infra. Here, the trial court considered these and other facts in finding the 
bystander's statement inadmissible (R505: 553-54). See Addendum C (Examination and 
Ruling Excluding Hearsay). 
To challenge this ruling on appeal, defendant is required to marshal the underlying 
facts and establish why those facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial 
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court's ruling, are legally insufficient to support the court's detemiination. See ProMax 
Development Corp , (;~io \ \ ui _:o. Because defendant has failed to meet the marshaling 
renin;* ment. \\v< ( '^ 'niiT,'-''' , ; i ^ -...hi - -- • \. , M >\/-//- f 
6041J60-6L 
A discussion of the facts establishes defendant's marshaling failures. 
Isaac Martinez can le ' ith defei idant t :»the par (:> and testified on his behalf at ti ial. 
See Statement of Facts, supra. During his testimony, defense counsel asked if Martinez 
received a telephone call from his cousin, James Storm (R505: 543-44). Martinez said that 
l : L ' ! c u \ e u - . -;L- .. ne „ :: ,: • .j>auei MMI.. . .:•_!.:,, pai i\, but admitted 
on cross-examination that he told the police that he did not :r :ik to Storm until the day after 
the shooting (R505: 546, 549). Defendant only minimally acknowledges this time 
discrepancy and wholly ignores its impact on the trial court s ruling. S ee Br.Aplt. at 20 n. 7 
&43 . 
Martinez had only briefly seen Storm at the party, did not know where Storm was at 
the time of the shootings, in ^ lie know where Storm was at the time of the telephone call, and 
did not know \ < - hat Storm 1 \i .d done alter the shooting bi it before the • : all (R 5051 549-50). 
Defendant ignores these facts. See Br.Aplt. at 20-21 & 40-43. Martinez only knew that 
when Storm called him, Storm, was allegedly "still walking away from the party and needed 
someone to pick him i ip"(R 505: 553). Defendant states tl lis fact,bi ltd : ssi lot acknowledge 
its impact on the court's ruling. See Br.Aplt. at 21 & 40-43. 
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Martinez described Storm as excited and yelling during the call (R505: 546-51). 
Martinez said Storm was "just stuttering, because he told me he saw something" (R505: 545). 
Defense counsel repeated, "He was stuttering?" (id.). Martinez responded: "Like he was I 
- I — I — I — I — I — I just saw Zeke [House] and Raf [Rafael] shoot Kehndra" (id.). The 
prosecutor objected to the hearsay statement and the court admonished the jury to disregard 
it (id.). 
Under further questioning by defense counsel, Martinez related that Storm was 
"blurting out" some statements during the call, but also acknowledged that Storm was 
responding to questions from Martinez (R505: 548). Defendant does not marshal this fact. 
See Br.Aplt. at 20-21 & 40-43. 
Defense counsel asked Martinez: "What did he tell you had excited him?" (id.). The 
prosecutor again objected that any response was inadmissible hearsay (id.). In a sidebar 
conference, defense counsel argued that Storm's out-of-court statement to Martinez was an 
excited utterance and, therefore, admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule (R505: 553). 
Defense counsel proffered that Storm told Martinez that he was in the front yard when the 
shooting occurred and saw House and Rafael "shooting guns towards the house" (R505: 553-
54). Counsel's proffer of the out-of-court statement (the two shot towards the house) was 
different than Martinez's stricken testimony (the two shot Kehndra). See Br.Aplt. at 20-21 
& 40-43. Consequently, the substance of the claimed excited utterance is not clear on this 
record. Defendant does not acknowledge this fact. 
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The trial court found that neither counsel's proffer nor Martinez's testimony 
established uiai jv^m s statement was an excited utterance: 
With reference to the alleged spontaneous utterance, despite the fact that 
[defense] counsel used exclusively leading questions to try to elicit from 
[Martinez] that there was a spontaneous component to the statement he heard 
from another individual, that did not come out. The best we heard was that 
someone may have been startled and there is a discrepancy as to what the 
timing of the statement was, whether it was some 9 to 12 minutes after the 
episode or whether it was the next day. . . . [E]ven though [Martinez] was led, he indicated 
that what [Storm] had told him was in response to questions from him. That it was not 
spontaneous comments, and therefore that is one of the many things the Court has 
considered. Incidentally, [Martinez] blurted out the answer in any event. And despite the 
fact that the Court has asked the jury to disregard that, as we all know, once something is said 
it's very hard for people to forget it's [sic] been said. So frankly, the defense managed to get 
in the statement in any event. 
(R505: 554-55). Defendant does not set forth the court's ruling in his brief nor otherwise 
acknowledge its factual basis. See Br.Aplt. at 20-21 & 40-43. 
because deuncain . . io auequaicr, mar^nai me iac;s in suppoa oi me irkii court s 
ruling, this Court should summarily reject defendant's claim of error. I ven • \ -u. - rr -Tii\. \ re 
considered, the trial court's ruling is correct. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Ruled ti tati I i at tinez C < mid t V < rt 1 i *stify to What-
a Bystander Told Him. 
Defendant does not dispute that Storm's out-of-court statement to Martinez is hearsay. 
See Br.Aplt. at 40-43. He argues only that the statement qualifies for admission as an 
Rule 803(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, recognizes the admissibility of "statement(s) 
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement caused by the event or condition. See Add. . \ . ,c theory behind the "excited 
35 
utterance" exception is that a state of excitement induced by the event "temporarily stills the 
capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication." West Valley 
City v. Hutto, 2000 UT App 188, f 12, 5 P.3d 1 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). The exception is limited only to "truly spontaneous outbursts . . . [and] not the 
ongoing discourse of an excited individual." Id. at f 14 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). For the individual's excited emotional reaction may be simply "the result 
of retelling the incident, rather than a result of remaining continuously under the original 
stress. Emotionalism in recounting a distressing event hours, days, or even years later is not 
uncommon, but it does not make the recounting an excited utterance." Id. at \ 22 n.8. 
A three-prong test applies in determining if an out-of-court statement constitutes an 
excited utterance: 
Hearsay statements fall withing the excited utterance exception when "(1) a 
startling event or condition occurred, (2) the statement was made while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition, 
and (3) the statement relates to the startling event or condition." 
Id. at H 15 (quoting State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Utah 1989)). 
Here, prongs one and three are not at issue. To meet the requirements of the second 
prong, defendant bears the burden to establish that Storm " 'remained' under the original, and 
unsubsided stress of the startling event when making the statements." See Hutto, 2000 UT 
App 188, ^ 15 & 20. Relevant factors to consider include the nature of the event, the 
emotional effect of the event on the Storm, Storm's age (adult as opposed to child), the lapse 
of time between the event and the statement, whether Storm was familiar with or aware of 
his surroundings when he made the statement, and whether the statement was spontaneous 
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or made in response to questioning. See id. at f^ 16 (citing State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 240 
( l L a - , ^ O ) l:. • .'>tt . . ' • J. , • L i . s ' •' ' : 
The trial court correctly found that even if Storm spoke excitedly, defendant failed to 
establish that Storm had ;:: mained continuously under the original stress" at the time he 
spoke with Martinez ( l oo . >4 IOJ. beeAJn. v . Morm was not a victim or a participant 
ill thr* JM)O1;I, . II.'-^ •<-• •!•. : . ; : t : ^p i - - ' \ i m a t e l v "f ' ,]«:- :: T-art^  liners present v«hiMT t*-'.3 
shooting occurred. Presumptively, Storm's reaction to the shooting was no different than the 
other bystanders, in^iudi;: Martinez. Iliey aii jast wanted to leave 1o facilitate this 
reas«T.:!b!e L^aL Si • vl \\\ •• :I! ^ M - M M . . ;;. n^cu^- >n '' t , : i: '^ -i ) 
focused on Storm's need for a ride. Martinez asked Storm why he was so excited (a strange 
question if indeed Martinez fled the same shooting only minutes before). Only then did 
Storm discuss w 1 lathe allegedly saw I he tola lity of these facts doi lot si ipport a finding that 
the Storm's statement wras wholly spontaneous or made without reasoned reflection. See 
Hutto, 2000 UT App 188, ^ 14 <fc 1 7 (recognizing that an "ongoing discourse of an excited 
i.Ki:',. :aa; ;k ^ :- . a\\K ... • an L \ J L U uiicrancc uine^.- .nc proponent .»: inc statement 
establishes that the declarant remained under the stress of the event to a degree which would 
preclude fabrication). 
ri nc conn ai;<-) pivj :. cun^iucica : = .c up-c oi nine :-ci\vccn inc ancged statement 
and the event and found the evidence conflicting. Martinez testified that Storm called him 
about 12 minutes after the shootings, but admitted that he told the police that he only spoke 
to Storm tlic clay alicr UK -.ilooting, il the statement was made the next day, this fact 
substantially negates its spontaneity. See Cude, 784 P.2d at 1200-01 (recognizing that even 
five to ten minutes may be sufficient to regain reasoned reflection after an event). But even 
if the statement was made 12 minutes after the shooting, Storm's actions and reactions during 
those 12 minutes must be considered. See id. Defendant presented no evidence to 
establishing Storm's actions during the interval or Storm's subjective character. SeeHutto, 
2000 UT App 188, f 24 (recognizing that evidence is necessary to show the declarant's 
emotional state during the intervening time between an event and the statement). To the 
extent Storm's actions may be gleaned from the record, they do not support a finding that he 
acted without reasoned reflection. After the shooting, Storm decided that it would be in his 
best interest to leave the scene. As he walked away, he remembered that his cousin Martinez 
was at the party. Storm remembered that Martinez had a cell telephone. He remembered the 
telephone's number. He dialed the number and asked for a ride. 
Given the record facts, the trial court correctly ruled that defendant failed to establish 
that Storm's statement was "free of conscious fabrication." SeeHutto, 2000 UT App 188, 
^ 12. Because the statement did not fall within an exception to the hearsay rule, the trial 
court properly excluded it from admission. 
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POINT III 
THE P R O S E C U I O k DID NOT COMMIT l U I M O K B l i J US 
CLOSING ARGUMENT WHEN HE SUMIVi \ R 1 / H > f lNDSFY 
ISAKSON'S TESTIMON\ 
During closing argument, the prosecutoi summarized Lindsey Isakson's testimony 
desci ibmg w hat occurred v\ I JL n dciendant leit the house attei In mg his gun in the li\ mg room 
(R506 ^40) Defendant did >1 ob|t < 1 to tin pio >oi utofs < h n u ten/ation of that U union . 
On appeal, defendant claims foi the fust time that the piosecutor committed 
prejudicial misconduct in summarizing Lmdsey's testimony See Br iplt at 46-48. Because 
defendant failed to pieseo \ (his issue below he nm t now » ( ihlish ill il his li utl UHIIIM 1 was 
ineffective in failing to object and/or that the trial court plainly cried m not sua sponte 
correcting the statement. See Coonce, 2001 UT \pp 355, ff 7-8. Defendant has failed to 
( s t aL i ! i li e i l l i ) 
A. Ike Prosecutor \ Properly tinned ike Fair Inference of Lindsey's 
Testimony. 
Lindsey Isakson testified that she was standing near the front door as defendant exited 
doin fbc hoior mnli ntifVd black MI\ n i l I h ndanl ' ii mo llio i \ 
Defendant responded "no" and ran out of the house with the gun m his hand. Lindsey 
testified that the "black guy" remained in the house See Statement of Facts, supra. 
1 indst\ and fl KM ill] n i h i iiilrmo^pd bin " HtM^ ICHM\ eh |iie lionet 1 ihonl lior 
pnoi statements to the police (R503: 196-98, 200, 213-15, R505: 511-12, 516-20). She 
clarified that the "black man" was in the house when defendant ian oul the door 
QUESTION: Now, when you say but I know it was [defendant who fired 
outside] because he couldn't give anybody else the gun, by the time when 
[you] saw him run out of there he had the gun in his hand. You told [the 
detective] when [defendant] ran out the door he had the gun in his hand; is that 
right? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
Q: And you were speculating to Detective Delahunty there's no way that you 
think they could exchange the guns, is that right? 
A: Yes, there's no way they could have. 
Q: Okay. 
A: The guy was still in the house at the time when he had run out there. 
Q: Okay. What guy? 
A: The guy that had asked him to give him the gun. 
(R503:215). 
In closing argument, defense counsel suggested that House was the "black guy" who 
asked for the gun and ultimately shot the victims (R506: 720). Counsel stated that Lindsey 
said the "black guy" and defendant ran out of the house together (R506: 726). 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor clarified that this was not Lindsey's testimony: 
Well, so it seems as though the defense's story that somebody took Lou's gun 
from him doesn't so much work out. And if you remember Lindsay Isakson's 
testimony, what she said was Lou [defendant] had a conversation in the 
doorway with somebody who said give me the gun, give me the gun, and Lou 
said no. It's uncontroverted that Lou said no. That Lou walked out the door 
with the gun still in his hand, still in his hand. And that the guy that was in the 
doorway with him went the other way. That is absolutely critical. Lindsay 
[sic] told you Lou went out of the house, the other guy came back in. They 




The prosecuior s summary 01 uinaseys ic>iiinon\ - . *;-;op^i. a *>/i: . - , 
?<IM- • ! v- -d '•% M-coeni/ing that a prosecutor may in closing 
"summarize the evidence and its inferences from his or her viewpoint"). Though Lindsey 
never described the two as going in "completely diiferent opposite directions, n\^ tair 
inferen c from ^"r f<^ tim> • -• ,1- •* '^fondant ^ =^ ? , •• ** .inwrl in. 
B. Because No Error Occurred, Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective and 
the Trial Court Did Not Plainly Err. 
Because no misconduct occurred. cic:cnuuiit .- :.:s ir:.:. -oun^ei • JM noi uongaioa \o 
object and the trial court was not obligated to intervene. See Kooyman, 2005 UT ' rv 222, 
€:
 30 (reaffirming that conn .1 is under no obligation to make futile objections). Cf. Cruz, 
I.* I-; i -r .. : •, (recognizing that plain error requires actual error). 
POT^ 
THE PROSEC I I OR DID NOT COMMIT MISCONDUCT WHEN HE 
REMINDED THE FURORS THEY WERE SELECTED T<) " U T AS 
THE VOICE AND CONSCIENCE OF THE COMMUNITY" AND 
OPINED THAT IF THEY CAME BACK WITH A NOT GUILTY 
. VERDICT, "TT TS \ S TRl IE TO SAY THAT THERE HA c RKFV v - ) 
CRIME" 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to other 
portions of the prosecutor s closing argument and in denying a motion to mistrial based on 
alleged pro^r •* •; • ::' Ser :l-- !• K • '• •"•'• - ": ;:\]U . i;»c: .;.-*; •* .t 
the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when she told the jurors that they "were 
selected to be on this jury to act as the voice and conscience of the community" (R506: 747). 
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Defendant also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when she opined that "if 
you say to [defendant] that he is not guilty, it is as true to say that there has been no crime" 
(id.). The trial court found the objection untimely, but nevertheless overruled both objections 
on the merits and denied defendant's motion for mistrial (R506:751-57). The court's rulings 
are correct. 
A. A Prosecutor May Remind the Jury that They Act as The Voice and 
Conscience of the Community in Adjudicating the Guilt or Innocence of an 
Accused. 
A prosecutor commits misconduct when he or she call "the jury's attention to matters 
which they would not be justified in considering in reaching their verdict" and the improper 
statements "probably influenced the jury verdict." State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287,1290 
(Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1994). It is not enough for a prosecutor's 
statement to be undesirable. See Harden v. Wainwright, All U.S. 168, 181 (1986). The 
defendant must establish that any "'error was substantial and prejudicial such that there is a 
reasonable likelihood, that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result.5" 
Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 1290 (quoting State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 
1992), cert denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)). 
Moreover, the propriety of the prosecutor's comment and any prejudicial effect must 
be judged in light of the "totality of the evidence presented at trial." Id. The denial of a 
motion for mistrial will not be overturned absent clear abuse of discretion. See State v. 
Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah App. 1997). 
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Here, defendant did not timely object when the prosecutor told the jury that in their 
role as jurors, they acted as the conscience 01 me c o m m u n i s 101 jo. .. . \everiheless, the 
"-•' :
]
 \ . ; r ; , ••• - L*-:--.J ,]-; -riN and o^e rn ibd :!v - H c v : •,-. ! v ; . ! ! i ^ tha c o m - v m was 
consistent with the court 's own comments to the jury (R506: 750-57). 
Defendant cites a l ia^if i i l oi cases in wlnca ai t lerent statements by prosecutors have 
been foi md to be u npropei See Br • i i >lt at : 19. These cases ha \ e little relevance here. 
On the other hand, many courts have directly addressed identically-worded arguments 
to those made here and all have consistently found no error or harmless error. Compare, e.g., 
*.. .*. i _ • * " • •• ' »• >2 • . 1 : l l . : ) • ! . ' _ . i l u I ' o - i ; \ e 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that "a prosecutor may a ^ c a l to the jury to act as the 
conscience of the community, so long as the comments are not calculated to inflame") 
I c iUi'] f MI a n a H L L ' w.. , nu . ii i n a i K> ••'. :.. - - . i i , . . 'j • M -.a .. J ( vt 
Cir. 1992) (reco jin i zing the Nin th and Eleventh Circuits ' views that a prosecutor may remind 
a jury that they "act as a conscience of the communi ty ," so long as the comments are not 
"spec ihcauy designee to ir,;.ame tnejuiy ).ccrt. demed.yn i .>> !• f* \K)l<ls>).mm lorbes 
\ Stjr> ™ ! v - " 3 ')4?_. o - \ l i s ^ . \ P ; \ ' n u ' i i i : - . ! • •.-• ' • - • ! ' . . ^ . . m ^ • • : . . . -o 
consider that ' the verdict you return is going to be reflective of the conscience of the 
commiinny, bui aL->u l ioh^ag Uie comment was lutrni!es.>,. see also State v. Hishop, 488 
*vF 2*1 ~(^} ~"v(> ,x • ' , ! i ' f 'ect^jni/nur , ! '' r • - ^ i ^ ' p " •• v : • "' -•'< ^ ' o 
the community ," but completely proper to encourage a jury "to act as the voice and 
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conscience of the community"). Consistent with this authority, the trial court properly 
overruled defendant's objection, 
B. The Prosecutor Fairly Responded to Defendant's Argument by 
Rhetorically Discussing a Not Guilty Verdict 
As previously noted, the context of a remark must be considered; isolated comments, 
even if improper, rarely rise to the level of misconduct. See United States v. Socony-
Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, 242 (1940) (refusing to find prosecutorial misconduct where 
improper remarks were isolated and not indicative of party's argument as a whole). 
Moreover, defense counsel's own argument may "invite" the prosecutor's challenged 
response. See Darden, All U.S. at 182. 
Here, defendant invited the response he complains of. Defense counsel explained to 
the jury different meanings that could be accorded a not guilty verdict. Defense counsel told 
them that a not guilty verdict could mean that defendant did not commit a crime or could 
mean that the evidence was insufficient (R506: 735-36). 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor opined that if the jury told defendant he was not guilty, "it 
is as true to say that there has been no crime" (R506: 747). Defendant objected and asked 
for a mistrial (R506: 747, 751-54). 
The court overruled the objection and refused to grant a mistrial (R506: 751-55). The 
court first found that the prosecutor's comment was no different than what defendant had 
argued about not guilty verdicts (id.). The court also found that the prosecutor's comment 
was clearly rhetorical: "Kehndra Isakson is dead, so obviously the prosecutor didn't mean 
it literally. It's argument. .." (R506: 751-52). 
44 
Because defendant fells to marshal the facts establishing the context of the comment, 
his claim siiv^.abe summarily rejected. S ee Widdison, 2001 [ J 1 60, ^ 60-61 If tl lemei its 
arec <* * -Ucivd thv* r-1- - : rivet. I'T-n. the comment was a fair, albeit not perfectly staled, 
response to defense counsel's argument. Compare R506: 735-36, with R506: 747. See also 
Bar den, 477 U.S. at 181-Q^ Second, even if the statement was improper, it was a single 
isolate : ^ente^ce - -.. -t^ • ise \* el^-tr1-^ "i^\ f'onscqi.- :i\ r : : -^ -• * -v* 1-. -1 
of misconduct justifying a new trial. See Socony-lracuum, 310 U.S. at 242. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing i easons, the State respectfi illy requests that the Com t affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
ri his l ourt luo wiscretion "io determine wmen mailers require u.al argumeni, w men. 
16. Mere, the decisional process would be significantly aided by oral argument. Cf. Utah R. 
App: P. 29(a)(3). Therefoiw. ihe State requests oral argument. 
RespeclUi 'K ^ " ' : this /A^Cj:- ' - ^ ! , -
 Mr- "V .. . 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
RULE 16. DISCOVERY 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense 
upon request the following material or information of which Tie has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefehdants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tend^ to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the' guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree^ of the 
offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following 
the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. 'The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo* 
sures at least ten days before trial1" or as soon as practicable. He has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information 
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. 
The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the further 
dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to prevent 
improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses from 
harassment, abuse, or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on the 
further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or psychological 
or medical reports.-
(f) Upon a sufficient showing die court may at any time order that ai^covery 
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further 
dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is appro-
priate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make such 
showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be inspected 
by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such 
an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and 
preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court 
in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continu-
ance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may 
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and 
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of 
the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the forego-
ing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall 
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the court, 
without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, 
may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration 
along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be 
subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate. 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 801. DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant'7 is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay, "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declar-
ant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted 
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or 
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the 
statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness 
denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, 
or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party 
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representa-
tive capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an 
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by 
the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by 
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the 
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) 
a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in further-
ance of the conspiracy. 
R U L E 8 0 3 . HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; AVAILABILITY OF DECLARANT 
IMMATERIAL 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant 
is available as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event 
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or 
immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition 
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of 
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical 
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily 
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact 
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identifi-
cation, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements 
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical 
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or 
general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably 
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter 
about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollec-
tion to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been 
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness' 
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memoran-
dum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an 
exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, 
or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or 
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a 
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimo-
ny of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies 
with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the 
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate 
lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph 
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of 
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, 
reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the 
matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compi-
lations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities 
of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by 
law as to which matters there Was a duty to report, excluding, however, in 
criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement 
personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government 
in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursu-
ant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of 
births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a 
public office pursuant to requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, 
report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or 
nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compila-
tion in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office or 
agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or 
testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, 
or data compilation, or entry. 
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, 
divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or 
other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept 
record of a religious organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact con-
tained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony 
or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other 
person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law 
to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time of 
the act or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family 
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, 
inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or 
the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a 
aocument purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of 
the content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by 
each person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a 
record of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of 
documents of that kind in that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement 
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in 
property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, 
unless dealings with the property since the document was made have been 
inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document. 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in exis-
tence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established. 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabu-
lations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and 
relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations. 
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert 
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct 
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pam-
phlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a 
reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other 
expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read 
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among 
members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a 
person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adop-
tion, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or 
marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a 
community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs 
affecting lands jn the community, and reputation as to events of general history 
important to the community or State or nation in which located. 
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among 
associates or in the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, en-
tered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo 
contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the 
judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal 
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons 
other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not 
affect admissibility. 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. 
Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or 
boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by 
evidence of reputation. 
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extremely important that the jury is advised that race or 
ethnicity is not to be considered in any respect, not to the 
detriment or to the benefit of the defendant. 
MS. TREASE: I agree, Judge. 
THE COURT: And I don't know that there are any other 
stocks that are out of the ordinary or that I want to call to 
your attention. 
Anything else that we need to discuss tonight? 
MS. TREASE: No, Judge. 
THE COURT: How many witnesses do you intend to call, 
Ms. Trease, and who are they? 
MS. TREASE: Do you want our wish list or who we 
think we are going to call? 
THE COURT: Why don!t you give me who you think you 
are going to call. 
MS. TREASE: Okay. We anticipate calling Detective 
Todd Park. 
THE COURT: Detective Park. 
MS. TREASE: Either Detective Ray Lopez or 
Detective -- either Officer Ray Lopez or Officer Eric Brown. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. TREASE: Marco Etsitty. 
THE COURT: Can you spell that for me? Is that 
E-c-s-t-i-t-y? 
MS. TREASE: E-t-s-i-t-t-y, I believe. 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. TREASE: Isaac Costello. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. TREASE: Officer Paul Barker. Officer Jeff 
Smith. Adrian Lewis. Aaron Zippro, Z-i-p-p~r-o. Matthew 
Pollock, P-o-l-l-o-c-k. And Stephen Butler. Those are who we 
anticipate calling, Judge, although there are other witnesses 
that are on our witness list that at this point --
THE COURT: What about the defendant? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, until we hear from those 
witnesses, I can't say for sure whether he is. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you have somewhere between 10 
to 12 witnesses; is that correct. 
MS. TREASE: Thatf s correct. And let me indicate 
that I don't anticipate that these witnesses will take more 
than possibly a half or three-quarters of the day tomorrow. 
They will be very short. 
THE COURT: Well, we'll hope that's the case. And 
we'll hope to start with the testimony about quarter to 9:00. 
I would ask counsel to be here at 8:30 so we can talk about 
jury instructions for a few minutes before beginning. I'm 
assuming that if we get all that testimony on tomorrow, the 
State will have Thursday morning to call rebuttal witnesses. 
And it may be difficult to anticipate at this point, but do you 
have a sense, Mr. Hall, of whether you will be calling any 
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rebuttal witnesses? 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, itfs going to depend obviously 
on what some of the defense witnesses say. And I'm trying to 
get ahold of the defense's witness list now. Some of the names 
aren't familiar to me, they might be familiar to Ms. Wissler. 
THE COURT: Well, they better be on the 
questionnaire. 
MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, I can assure the Court that 
a number of those names are not on the defendant's witness list 
and I have some grave concerns about that. 
MR. HALL: That's why I'm trying to find the list. 
THE COURT: This is not a good sign. 
MS. TREASE: Wait a minute, Judge. Not all these 
witnesses are on the questionnaire, but every single one of 
these witnesses has a transcript that the State has provided to 
us — 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. 
MS. TREASE: — of their testimony. 
THE COURT: Why didn't you disclose your witnesses to 
the other side? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, we disclosed our witnesses to the 
other side as best we could of who we anticipated calling. 
Some of these witnesses we are calling in — 
THE COURT: Who did you not disclose that is not on 
the questionnaire? 
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MS. TREASE: No, they are all on the questionnaire. 
All these witnesses are on the questionnaire. If thatfs the 
Courtfs concern, every one of them — 
THE COURT: I have two concerns. I have a concern 
about them being disclosed and about them being on the 
questionnaire. If they are on the questionnaire, theyfve been 
disclosed is how I look at it. 
MS. TREASE: And thatfs — we — every single one of 
these witnesses is in a police report and we took all the names 
in the questionnaire from the police report and from 
transcripts of interviews that the State has done in this case. 
THE COURT: So what is your concern, Mr. Hall? 
MR. HALL: Oh, it's only, your Honor, that it!s just 
that ITm not totally personally familiar with all the names. 
Ms. Wissler -- between the two of us perhaps we are. And I was 
just trying to grab the defendant's witness list to make sure 
that they had pointed out — 
THE COURT: Well, if they are on the questionnaire 
under the possible witnesses to be called by the defense, then 
you are on notice. 
MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, the concern that the State 
has is that the Court specifically ordered both sides in this 
case to exchange witness lists on or before November the 7 
THE COURT: I did. 
MS. WISSLER: The defense provided us with a witness 
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list of I think some 15 odd people, something in that 
neighborhood, 12, 15 people, and that's the witness list upon 
which the State relied. There's obviously a hundred people on 
the questionnaire. The State didn't call most of those people, 
the defense isn't intending to call most of those people. But 
I think the State is entitled to rely upon the witness list 
that was ordered to be produced. 
THE COURT: Who was listed on the witness list? 
MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, Todd Park was not listed, 
Ray Lopez was not listed, Marco Ecstity was not listed. 
THE COURT: Just a minute, you're going to too fast. 
MS. WISSLER: Jeff Smith I don't believe was listed. 
And I don't recall whether Adrian Lewis, Aaron Zippro, Matthew 
Pollock or Steven Butler were listed. 
THE COURT: Do you think I could write that fast? 
MS. WISSLER: I'm sorry, I didn't know you wanted to 
write them down. 
THE COURT: I do. Did you mention a name Lewis? 
MS. WISSLER: Didn't you say Adrian Lewis? 
THE COURT: Did you say that? 
MS. TREASE: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that was not on the witness list? 
MS. WISSLER: I don't recall, Judge, because we can't 
put our hands on a copy of that list. 
MR. HALL: It's in here, I'm digging for it. 
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THE COURT: Who was on your witness list, Ms. Trease? 
MS. TREASE: And let me say this, Judge, as the 
State — 
THE COURT: Before you talk about your rational, who 
was on your witness list? 
MS. TREASE: Our witness list includes James Storm, 
Heather- Garcia, Jamie Vigil --
THE COURT: None of the people you've mentioned. 
MS. TREASE: Matthew Pollock. 
THE COURT: That's one. 
MS. TREASE: Isaac Costello. 
MR. HALL: Okay. 
MS. TREASE: Jose Gonzales. Paris Page. Gustavo 
Roman. Angle Balderama. Paul Barker. Vaun Delahunty. Carl 
Edwards. Ashley Nelson. And Rafael Haney. 
THE COURT: Okay. So most of the people that you 
intend to call were not on your witness list? 
MS. TREASE: They were not, Judge, but these 
witnesses, every single one of these witnesses has a 
statement -- has made a statement to the State. They are aware 
of these witnesses. 
THE COURT: I know what you're saying. And I'm going 
to withhold a decision until tomorrow. But I find it extremely 
unprofessional that tapes that are provided are not listened to 
by both sides or reviewed or viewed by both sides. That 
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witness lists are not pared down. And that a witness list 
thatfs accurate is not provided to the other side. What it 
amounts to is it sounds like preparation for the trial was done 
the weekend before trial and that by the time of the pretrial 
back in early November, none of these decisions had been made. 
And now you're asking me to allow the witnesses to testify. 
And they weren't on your witness list. Is that about the gist 
of it? 
MS. TREASE: Judge — 
THE COURT: That preparation was the last weekend? 
MS. TREASE: It was not, Judge. But some of these 
witnesses — we decided not to call certain witnesses because 
of some of the evidence that the State — 
THE COURT: Why didn't you list these people — 
MS. TREASE: — presented today — 
THE COURT: — that you talked about today as 
potential witnesses on your witness list that you exchanged 
with counsel? 
MS. TREASE: I tried, Judge, to rather than — I 
could have listed all the witnesses in the questionnaire, which 
is as the Court knows is close to a hundred witnesses. 
THE COURT: No, what you're supposed to do is list 
the people you were going to be calling. 
MS. TREASE: Or who we thought we would be calling, 
Judge. And at the time that we did this, those were the 
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witnesses that we thought we would call. 
THE COURT: When did you make the decision to call 
the witnesses that you just told me about? 
MS, TREASE: Some of them we've made just this week, 
Judge. In fact, some of them were subpoenaed this week. 
THE COURT: When did you make the decision to call 
these witnesses? 
MS. TREASE: I!11 have to check the subpoenas, Judge. 
THE COURT: Some of them you knew about before trial 
and did not disclose to the other side; is that correct? 
MS. TREASE: Some of them we anticipated possibly 
calling today or tomorrow when we put on our case, but --
THE COURT: I'm not getting an answer. Let me try 
again. And I don't mean to be unfair or unkind, but I'm trying 
to figure this out. You knew that some of the witnesses you 
had not listed on your witness lists were going to be called, 
that was prior to trial, correct? 
MS. TREASE: I knew they were possibly going to be 
called, Judge. 
THE COURT: Why didn't you tell the other side? 
MS. TREASE: I anticipated, Judge, because they 
already had the reports, and what we anticipate these witnesses 
to testify are the same things that they told the State in this 
case, the State already knows about it --
THE COURT: What do you think the purpose of my 
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setting a deadline or any — 
MS. TREASE: Judge — 
THE COURT: — setting a deadline for designation of 
witnesses is? DonTt you think that that means that that's the 
date by which witnesses needs to be designated? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, as we indicated in our list when 
we provided it to the State, this is the list of witnesses that 
at the time we anticipated calling, but that there was a 
possibility, and we indicated that to the State, that there may 
be witnesses not on this list that we might call. And that it 
includes every single witness that the State has — is already 
aware is a potential witness in this case. All these people 
are potential witnesses that the State have talked to. 
THE COURT: I!m aware that there are about a hundred 
different witnesses that could have been called. I still don't 
understand why you did not notify the State of who you intended 
to call out of that long list. And I think it's — I'll 
probably allow the witnesses to testify because great latitude 
is given to defendants in criminal cases, but I'll be honest 
with you, this is unprofessional in my opinion. And I have 
real problems with a nondisclosure of witnesses. And I have a 
hard time understanding why you did not advise the State of 
changes in your plans. And I can't believe that you made all 
the changes today. 
When did you send out your subpoenas for these 
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witnesses? 
MS. TREASE: They were sent out at different times, 
Judge, and I canft answer at this time. 
THE COURT: I'm not getting an answer I guess. On 
Mr. Parks, Detective Park, when did you send out your subpoena? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, to tell you the truth, we haven't 
even subpoenaed Detective Park. I asked Mr, Johnson to call 
Detective Park. 
THE COURT: When did you send out your subpoena on 
Detective Lopez? 
MS. TREASE: Other than Detective Park which we 
talked about today, Judge, I can't answer the question on the 
others. 
THE COURT: Do you have copies of what you sent out? 
MS. TREASE: I'm sure we do. I don't have them with 
me here today. 
THE COURT: Well, let me suggest you better get them 
because I want to know at what point you made the decision and 
whether or not there was an opportunity to tell the State. I 
am of the belief that a criminal trial is not supposed to be a 
game of hide the ball. That both sides, with the exception of 
disclosing whether or not the defendant is going to testify, 
have an obligation to notify the Court and the other side of 
who they will be calling. And I find it extremely disturbing 
that we've had all these issues that have come up that relate 
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to last-minute preparation. It appears that a lot of things 
that should have been done well in advance of trial were not 
done. And I want to know in the morning before you call any of 
these witnesses when you made the decision to call them. 
So Detective Park still hasn't been subpoenaed? 
MS. TREASE: Your Honor, Detective Park was on the 
State's witness list. We anticipated that he would testify. 
THE COURT: By you? 
MS. TREASE: He has not been subpoenaed by us. 
THE COURT: Who else has not been subpoenaed by you? 
MS. TREASE: It's probably just Detective Park, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Everybody else has been subpoenaed? 
MS. TREASE: That's my understanding, although I 
haven't seen the subpoenas. 
THE COURT: So you can tell me tomorrow morning at 
what point they were subpoenaed? 
MS. TREASE: I'll do my best. 
THE COURT: Well, you ought to have a record of that. 
MS. TREASE: And that's — I will try to find the 
record of that and provide it if that's what the Court is 
ordering. 
THE COURT: No, what the Court ordered was that the 
names of witnesses to be called be provided by the pretrial 
conference. And that was not done. What I'm now asking for is 
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an indication of when you chose to subpoena these witnesses. 
I'm trying to give you a break here because you obviously did 
not disclose them, as you acknowledge, by the date you were 
supposed to disclose them. Ifm trying to figure out when you 
figured — determined that you wanted them as witnesses. 
MS. TREASE: I can say this much, the witnesses that 
I've mentioned were subpoenaed after we provided the list to 
the State because the list --
THE COURT: I'm sure of that. But my question to you 
is when? If they were subpoenaed before trial, and I'm 
assuming they were, I'm wondering why you didn't notify the 
State. 
MS. TREASE: Well, I admit, Judge, I haven't notified 
the State of these witnesses until right now when you asked me 
who they were, the witnesses that were not on the list. 
However, I want to impress to the Court — 
THE COURT: Can I ask you why? 
MS. TREASE: I assumed, Judge, that they're witnesses 
that they've already talked to. They are witnesses that are on 
the questionnaire. They are witnesses that they provided us 
statements for. 
THE COURT: Let me get counsel to approach. 
(Side-bar conference.) 
THE COURT: If there's nothing further, we need the 
defense instructions to copy. And then I think we're in 
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(The following proceedings were held in open court 
out of the presence of the jury.) 
THE COURT: Please be seated. We!re here for day 
three in the trial of State versus Tiliaia. This is case 
number 011915514. This morning I!ve been handed a motion to 
exclude the testimony of Marco Etsitty, Adrian Lewis, Aaron 
Zippro, and Steven Butler. These obviously are some of the 
people that were named yesterday by the defense as proposed 
witnesses. My understanding is they were on the list of a 
hundred witnesses that were provided to the jury as part of the 
questionnaire. They were, however, not provided on the 
defendants statement of witnesses that was ordered by the 
Court and supposed to be provided at the time of the pretrial. 
I haven't had a chance to read it. It just was 
handed to me, so let me ask Ms. Wissler if you1re willing to 
speak to the issue on the record? 
MS. WISSLER: Certainly, your Honor. Your Honor, the 
motion is supported almost in its entirety by United States 
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Supreme Court case which is referred to on page 4 of the 
Statef s memorandum, that' s Taylor versus Illinois. If ve 
provided the Court with a copy, as well as defense counsel, for 
convenience. I donTt believe that there's any significant 
dispute about the facts as set forth in the State's memorandum, 
although I'm sure I'll be corrected if I've misstated 
something. 
Your Honor, the State's position is that in accord 
with Taylor versus Illinois, the exclusion of these witnesses 
is a perfectly appropriate sanction given the fact that this is 
clearly a willful violation of the Court's discovery order. It 
appears as though at least one of these witnesses, and 
specifically Marco Etsitty, was subpoenaed perhaps as early as 
October the 25 , as reflected in the Court docket as I 
reviewed it yesterday. So it appears as though at least 
Mr. Etsitty was known as a witness or a potential witness to 
the defense as early as October the 25 ' just some three weeks 
ago, yet that name was never provided to the State until 
yesterday. 
The unfortunate part about this, Judge, or maybe it's 
fortunate, is that the Court required the defense yesterday to 
provide that list of its witnesses, were it not for the Court's 
requiring defense to do that, the State simply would have been 
caught off guard this morning and completely and utterly 
blinded with no time to prepare on these witnesses and or 
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cross-examination. So the State is firmly of the opinion that, 
specifically in the case of Mr. Etsitty, the exclusion of his 
testimony is a perfectly appropriate sanction. 
As the Court is aware, we had a significantly long 
discussion at the bench yesterday, during which there were some 
conversations about discussions that were had last week between 
my co-counsel and counsel for the defendant and it appeared as 
though at that time it was known to the defense that they 
intended to call witnesses who had not previously been 
disclosed; yet in response to the Statefs request for a list of 
subpoenaed witnesses, we received nothing. We were not 
informed until yesterday of the defendants intent to call 
Mr. Etsitty, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Zippro, or Mr. Butler. Given the 
fact that at least some of these people, perhaps all of them, 
were known to the defense as witnesses or potential witnesses 
as early as some three weeks ago, and given the fact that the 
State had made specific requests of the defense to provide a 
list of subpoenaed witnesses, and given the utter lack of any 
explanation yesterday on the part of defense counsel, the State 
is left to conclude that this was simply a willful violation 
that was designed and calculated to provide the defense team 
with some strategy or some strategic benefit. In the absence 
of any other explanation, your Honor, I think that conclusion 
is inescapable and so we would ask the Court to issue an order 
excluding the testimony of those four witnesses. 
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THE COURT: There's an interesting paragraph which 
appears to be a quote from the case to which youTve alluded to 
on page 6 of your memorandum, the language in it strikes me as 
particularly apropos: More is at stake than possible prejudice 
to the prosecution and we are all concerned with the impact of 
this kind of conduct on the integrity of the judicial process 
itself. The trial judge found that the discovery violation in 
this case was both willful and blatant in view of the fact the 
petitioner's counsel had actually interviewed the witness 
during the week before trial. Further fact, he amended his 
answer to discovery on the first day of trial without 
identifying the witness while he did identify two actual 
eyewitnesses who he did place on the stand. 
We don't even have a situation here where there is an 
identification of the witnesses on the first day of trial. 
Would you like to respond to this Ms. Trease? I'd be 
interested in knowing what I asked yesterday, when did you 
subpoena these witnesses? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, when the Court indicated 
yesterday that you were not interested in that, I did not look 
as I had — 
THE COURT: Is it true that one of the witnesses, 
Mr. Etsitty, was subpoenaed in October? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, it might have been. If the 
return that's on that day --
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THE COURT: On an issue of this importance you 
havenf t checked? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, when you indicated that you were 
going to take what had been represented yesterday as what 
occurred in this case, I assumed that the Court would do that. 
And that may very well be true, Judge. We filed our list of 
witnesses, we included in that list, as the State did also, 
that there may be other witnesses that we may call depending on 
what occurs in this case. There are a lot of witnesses that we 
subpoenaed that we don't intend to call given what the State --
THE COURT: Unfortunately the witnesses you do intend 
to call were not designated. And maybe you have an explanation 
today, you didn't yesterday afternoon. Do you have an 
explanation for why those names were not provided? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, the explanation I gave the Court 
yesterday is the explanation that we have. When we provided 
that list to the State we made it clear to the State, as they 
did when they provided us their list, that as we prepare for 
trial there may be changes. 
THE COURT: Well, there is a Court order in place 
that witnesses were to be designated by a certain time. If the 
prosecution had failed to designate witnesses, there would be 
no question that you would be on your feet asking me to exclude 
those witnesses and I'd be granting the motion. I don't know 
why I should treat it differently because it's the defense. 
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Let me ask you one additional question. Did you say 
to Mr. Hall last week, on approximately Thursday, I may be 
surprising you with some additional witnesses? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, I did not say that. What I said 
to him was we may provide or we may use as an exhibit a tape 
recording of the sentencing of one of the witnesses that the 
State may call that is a codefendant that was offered a deal by 
the State to testify. I told him that we had discussions about 
whether or not the tape recording was admissible. 
THE COURT: So you're saying that there was no 
discussion with Mr. Hall about witnesses that might be a 
surprise or other witnesses you might be calling? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, I would not do that to the State. 
I would not bring in witnesses that — 
THE COURT: That means you1re saying Mr. Hall 
misrepresented yesterday? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, I don't recall that conversation. 
But let me say this, every single witness that we intend to 
call today is a witness that the State has known is a potential 
witness for over a year. 
THE COURT: You have a duty to disclose your 
witnesses, why didn!t you do so? 
MS. TREASE: We — 
THE COURT: There are on the list of witnesses in the 
questionnaire I think over a hundred witnesses. They can't be 
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expected, nor can you be expected, to prepare for all of those 
witnesses, which is why there was an order in place that at the 
time of the pretrial each side was to disclose to the other 
side who they actually intended to call. The distinction being 
the may calls and the will calls. If this were a civil case 
there would be no question, I wouldn't even hesitate, I would 
exclude the witnesses. 
Let me ask you this, will you make a proffer to me of 
what each of these witnesses are going to say, starting with 
Mr. Etsitty. 
MS. TRKA.SE: Mr. Etsitty, Judge, will testify in 
regards to he was at the party and, again, as a part of the 
record would indicate that — Marco Etsitty was interviewed 
previously by the State — 
THE COURT: Okay, what I'm asking, Ms. Trease — 
we're running out of time, what I'm asking is what is the 
proffer you're making of what he would say. 
MS. TREASE: He will testify about what he told the 
police at the time that he was interviewed. 
THE COURT: What will he testify to? 
MS. TREASE: Let me defer to counsel that's going to 
question Mr. Etsitty. 
THE COURT: So you don't even know what he's going to 
say? 
MS. TREASE: Well, there's three of us, Judge — 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, it!s anticipated that I will 
be questioning Mr. Etsitty. What's anticipated that he will be 
testifying to is that he was at the party. That he heard 
shots. That he heard a black man — or saw a tall black guy 
shooting. He would testify further -- I think he would testify 
regarding what Mr. Tiliaia was wearing and regarding some 
conversations with a Zeke and Rafael. 
THE COURT: Okay. What will Mr. Adrian Lewis be 
testifying to? 
MS. TREASE: Your Honor, at this time I don't think 
we will call Mr. Lewis. 
THE COURT: Are you agreeing you will not call him? 
MS. TREASE: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. That takes us to Aaron 
Zippro, what will he be testifying to? Is there a proffer on 
that? 
MS. KOCH: Your Honor, if Mr. Zippro does testify, he 
will testify that he was at the party and he talked to the 
officer and told the officer that he saw two males exiting the 
party, one carrying a gun, and he describes the one male was 
wearing a light blue shirt walking out the front door and 
another male was wearing a yellow shirt. 
THE COURT: Will he be identifying who those people 
were that were carrying the guns? 
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MS. KOCH: He does not identify so in his police 
report. 
THE COURT: All right. Have you had a conversation 
with him where that question was put to him? 
MS. KOCH: I have not had the opportunity to talk to 
Mr. Zippro. 
THE COURT: Okay. And what about Mr. Butler? 
MS. TREASE: Mr. Butler will testify consistent with 
+"T"i 
his statement to police on his interview of November 5 of 
last year that he saw a black male with afro-style hair wearing 
shorts coming out of the house, jumped off the porch, pointed a 
gun at the house and he fired. That he thinks this is the same 
person that he saw earlier that night with a pick in his hair. 
And this is consistent with his interview with the police. 
THE COURT: Would you like to respond again, 
Ms. Wissler? 
MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, what I would like to 
present the Court is a copy of the page of the docket of this 
case that indicates the date on which Mr. Etsitty was 
subpoenaed which is clearly, according to the docket, the 25 
of October of this year. 
THE COURT: You did not, however, have this 
information until yesterday? 
MS. WISSLER: That's correct, your Honor. Well, 
that's the -- your Honor, I take that back. That is a document 
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that Mr. Hall and I looked up on our computer on Saturday 
afternoon as we were in our office making our final trial 
preparations. And in the sheer hope that we may discover 
something from the court docket, we located that docket for the 
first time. We had not been told by the defense or anyone else 
that that person would actually be called as a witness. And if 
the Court will notice, there are three other people on that 
list who were subpoenaed by the defense who evidently arenft 
being called as witnesses. 
THE COURT: Costello and Roman? 
MS. WISSLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: William. All right. I'm going to 
exclude the witness!s testimony. As I said yesterday, I'm not 
only concerned about the defendant getting a fair trial, Ifm 
also concerned about what is appropriate conduct by counsel. 
And in this case Ifm not going to condone the fact that a 
witness was subpoenaed on October 25 and not -- the State was 
not notified of that until the middle of trial. I have some 
grave concerns about it. And it appears that the case cited by 
the prosecution, Taylor versus Illinois, is directly on point. 
Mr. Etsitty will not be testifying. 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, may I interrupt? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. HALL: Just so the record is clear, the Court 
made a comment that may be a finding and just so I can have the 
L 
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benefit of the record briefly, if the Court would indulge me? 
THE COURT: Surely. 
MR. HALL: The discussion yesterday that we had at 
the bench I approached with great hesitation because Ifm 
extremely reluctant to address to the Court recollections of 
verbal conversations between me and anybody else. As everyone 
appreciates, while no one surely in this court has got any 
intention to be deceptive, recollections can honestly differ. 
So if I could just relay to the Court precisely my recollection 
of the discussion with the defense counsel on Thursday. 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
MR. HALL: It was at a roll call, your Honor, where 
Ms. Trease approached me with a renewed request for wrap sheets 
for witnesses that she had requested and that we had not 
provided to her at that time. I indicated to Ms. Trease that I 
had asked the paralegal in our office to run those wrap sheets 
and that I was making every effort to get them to her as fast 
as possible. I then responded something to the effect of, and 
how about another witness list from you that has the people you 
intend to call? And Ms. Trease indicated, as I recall, we 
don't know exactly who we're going to call, it's going to 
depend on what goes on, but there may be some witnesses that 
weren't on our witness list and that there may be some evidence 
that's not on the evidence list. And I said, in effect, excuse 
me, I'm sorry, what do you mean? And then Ms. Trease said, 
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well, specifically one bit of evidence was a videotape of a 
witness who the State anticipated on calling in terms of 
impeachment evidence. And I didn't really address that other 
than to say, well, Ifll tell Ms. Wissler whatever it is you 
want me to tell her, but when I go back to the office and relay 
this to her I think we're going to have an issue. 
Actually, Ms. Wissler took it in much better stride 
than I thought, frankly. And so our discussion from then 
ensued that we probably ought to reexamine who was on the 
witness list. Ms. Trease did not indicate to me that she was 
going to surprise me with a witness. She never indicated to me 
that she had somebody -- it was clearly a discussion of 
witnesses and evidence together in the same conversation that 
may not be on the list. 
Now, I didn't explore that further with her because 
frankly I didn't know exactly procedurally how to do it. 
THE COURT: She alluded to the fact that they might 
be calling witnesses that were not on the list? 
MR. HALL: That's my recollection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And she did not give you those names at 
that time? 
MR. HALL: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HALL: And I ~ 
THE COURT: Well, based upon not that conversation --
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MS. TREASE: Judge — 
THE COURT: — but the fact that the subpoena went 
out on Mr. Etsitty on October 25 , which indicates clearly 
that the defense knew they would be calling this witness, I'm 
not going to allow testimony from Mr. Etsitty. 
Yes, Counsel. 
MS. TREASE: Your honor, if I could just have a 
minute to indicate the State has indicated that the case that 
they provided is on all fours not compared to this case. The 
case the State provided, Judge, talks about witnesses that the 
State did not know about. Witnesses that the State had never 
talked to, witnesses that the State had never interviewed, and 
based on that the Court excluded those witnesses. 
I want to reiterate for the record that the witnesses 
that we intend to call, even though they were not provided on 
our original witness list, are witnesses that the State has 
talked to, they have transcripts of interviews with these 
witnesses, these witnesses were identified on the questionnaire 
as potential witnesses and the information that we have on 
those witnesses comes from that. And what we intend for them 
to testify about today is very similar to the information or 
the interviews that they already have given to the State. 
THE COURT: You want to speak to that issue? 
MS. WISSLER: I do, your Honor. To suggest that the 
questionnaire in this case amounts somehow to notice that the 
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defense intended to call these witnesses is ridiculous. 
THE COURT: I!m not buying that. 
MS. WISSLER: There are 152 names on that list. 
THE COURT: What ITm asking, I guess, Counsel, is 
Ms. Trease has indicated that there ought to be more latitude 
given to the defense, as I understand it, because you have had 
interviews or have had a chance to talk to these witnesses; do 
you want to speak to that issue? 
MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, these witnesses were 
interviewed in excess of a year ago by the police. Because of 
the nature of their statements, they were never contacted 
again. They were -- essentially their transcripts were read, 
their testimony was deemed to have no evidentiary value to the 
State and they were put aside with the other 140 some odd 
people that were listed on that list. The State has had no 
meaningful opportunity to speak to these people, we've had no 
opportunity at all let alone a meaningful opportunity. Since 
we found out that they were called to be witnesses we certainly 
are entitled to go out, reinterview those people and ask them 
questions. We've had no opportunity to do that. We based our 
trial strategy upon the witness list we were given which is 
evidently just a random list of people, most of these people 
arenft being called as witnesses, and there are these seven 
other people that are being called. 
Our trial strategy has been compromised and has been 
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prejudiced based upon their violation of your order. Not only 
that, your Honor, but the State may have and in fact likely 
would have called different witnesses in rebuttal had we known 
that these individuals were going to be called. We don!t have 
the opportunity to subpoena these other people now. 
THE COURT: Well, you had the opportunity to contact 
them. I guess you don!t have the opportunity clearly to 
subpoena them. 
MS. WISSLER: I don't, your Honor. In fact, one of 
the individuals that we would have called as a rebuttal witness 
or at least attempted to call as a rebuttal witness I attempted 
to make contact by telephone last night at 7:00 o'clock, the 
only telephone number we have for that person is disconnected. 
We've had no opportunity to investigate that person's current 
whereabouts. There's absolutely no way that we could have 
adequately prepared for the cross-examination of these 
witnesses. And not only the cross-examination of the 
witnesses, but the impact that these witnesses have on the 
State's presentation of its evidence. There's no 
underestimating the prejudicial effect that this nondisclosure 
has had on the State's case. And that's what the crux of the 
Taylor case is all about, your Honor, it's that the State 
should not be prejudiced because the defense, for strategic or 
other reasons, chooses to willfully violate a Court order, 
which is exactly what occurred in this case. The State should 
473 
not be prejudiced and our case should not be compromised any 
more than the defendants should because of this willful 
violation, that!s why the sanction is appropriate, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may respond to that if you wish. Ifd 
like to hear why you haven!t disclosed these names. I've never 
gotten an adequate explanation to that. Give me a good reason. 
MS. TREASE: Judge, when we provided our original 
witness list that's who we thought we wanted to call at that 
time. 
THE COURT: Yes, and since that time you have changed 
your mind, why haven't you notified the State? 
MS. TREASE: Since that time because of evidence that 
the witness has presented, we subpoenaed a lot of people that 
we didnf t intend to call, some of those people we had to 
subpoena to even get them to talk to us because they are 
witnesses that are reluctant to talk to us, they are witnesses 
that are on the State's side. 
THE COURT: Let me see if I understand what you're 
saying because it's not making a great deal of sense to me. 
Are you saying that you didn't decide who to call until the 
middle of trial? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, some of the witnesses --
THE COURT: What are you saying, Ms. Trease? 
MS. TREASE: I'm saying some of the witnesses we did 
not decide to call until the State had put on their case. 
474 
THE COURT: Okay. And that certainly could not be 
true of Mr. Etsitty. 
MS. TREASE: We subpoenaed Mr. Etsitty, Judge, but 
we've been juggling witnesses and trying to decide who we're 
going to call. Even this morning we have decided to not call 
certain witnesses and that's because, Judge, the defense has to 
listen to what the State has to offer before deciding what to 
put on. The State has the burden and just because we have a 
certain list of witnesses, Judge, doesn't mean that's who we're 
going to put on. 
THE COURT: That is what it means, Ms. Trease. When 
the Court says you must designate your witnesses, you must. 
And I am very lenient about allowing late disclosure of 
witnesses. If you had amended or supplemented your witness 
list even as late as last Friday, my ruling would be different; 
but you did not. And if we were talking about one witness, it 
would be one thing. We're talking about four different 
witnesses. I'm not going to allow Mr. Etsitty to testify. 
I will consider the issue of Mr. Zippro and 
Mr. Butler again. Are they here this morning? 
MS. TREASE: They aren't. 
THE COURT: How come? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, we subpoenaed them, we called 
them, again these two individuals are witnesses that are 
reluctance to come forward and testify and they're not here. 
475 
THE COURT: So the State doesn't even have a chance 
to interview them before they are called, that was what I was 
hoping could occur and then I could give you the opportunity to 
call the witnesses. But they1re not even here; is that the 
idea? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, I don!t know why they're not 
here, 
is — 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, well, the bottom line 
MS. TREASE: I --
THE COURT: — Mr. Etsitty who was clearly subpoenaed 
on October 25 will not be testifying. As to the other two 
witnesses that the defense has indicated they may be calling, 
Mr. Zippro and Mr. Butler, if the State has an opportunity to 
interview them at least an hour before they take the stand, I 
will reconsider that issue. If that is not made available to 
them, it!s not going to occur. 
You indicated, Ms. Trease, that you would have all of 
your witnesses here ready to go this morning, as I understood 
it. And these witnesses are not even here at this late date 
for anyone to interview them. But I will leave the door open 
on Mr. Zippro and Mr. Butler if, as I said, the State has at 
least an hour to talk to them prior to them being called as 
witnesses. 
I am relying on the case cited. I am also relying on 
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basic principles of equity and the fact that this is not a 
run-of-the-mill trial. This is a homicide trial where the 
expectation is that both sides are going to be well prepared. 
And frankly, my observation is that the defense has been 
extremely well prepared, they have had their questioning and 
their total preparation very well handled, indicating that they 
have known all along how they wanted to try this case. This is 
not a case where the defense has not made a good showing in 
terms of representation of their client. On the contrary, 
we've had a display from the defense of excellent 
representation. And consequently, I cannot find that this was 
an error or just an omission on the part of the defense. 
Theref s very careful preparation that's occurred here, shown by 
the excellent performance of defense counsel. That it appears 
that it was a choice, especially since Mr. Etsitty, as 
indicated, was subpoenaed as long ago as October 25 . And Ifm 
assuming that he was talked to by the defense on or about that 
time or prior to that time since certainly one would not call a 
witness one has not talked to. 
Again, I!m leaving open the question of whether 
Mr. Zippro and Mr. Butler can testify if they show up and the 
State has an opportunity to talk to them an hour before they 
testify, they may be allowed to go forward. 
MS. TREASE: Mr. Butler is apparently here, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. Would you like to go talk to 
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him? We'll keep the 
MR. HOWARD: 
when the Court asked 
going to testify to, 
THE COURT: 
jury waiting, I guess. 
Your Honor, for purposes of the record, 
for the proffer of what Mr. Etsitty was 
I've tried to keep it in general terms. 
Well, you didn't talk about Mr. Etsitty, 
I think Ms. Trease did. 1 
MR. HOWARD: Actually, Judge, I'm the one who gave 



















So I would like to give a more detailed 
It doesn't matter, he's not going to 
For purposes of the record I would like 
Go ahead. 
If I may. 
Have you talked to Mr. Etsitty? 1 
Judge, we did speak with Mr. Etsitty. 
When? 
I'm not sure of the exact date. I 
Well, give me a ballpark figure. 
He was I believe sometime at the end of 
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THE COURT: All right. Would that have been before 
the last day of October? Would that have been before you 
subpoenaed or after you subpoenaed him? 
MR. HOWARD: I don!t have a specific recollection of 
the exact date. 
THE COURT: And you can't say whether it was before 
or after you subpoenaed him, but youTre sure it was in October? 
MR. HOWARD: I believe it was in October. 
THE COURT: Was it or wasn't it? 
MR. HOWARD: I can only tell the Court what I recall, 
and I believe that it was in October. 
THE COURT: All right. You may make your record. 
MR. HOWARD: My understanding, based on the interview 
that Mr. Etsitty gave to the police and also our brief 
conversations with him, was that he did go to the party on 
September 29 at the address in question in this case. He was 
in the basement of the house. He heard a fight or some sort of 
noise going on upstairs, tried to go upstairs to see what was 
going on but was unable to because the stairs were packed and 
therefore he exited the house through a basement window. Went 
through the backyard, jumped over the fence, still heard some 
shooting coming from the front yard, looked back and saw a 
black person shooting, describes him as being a tall black guy. 
Indicated to the police during his interview that there were no 
front lights, that it was dark both when he left and when he 
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arrived at the party. That he did not know where Lou, the 
defendant in this case, went. And further, that he had 
subsequent conversations with Ezekiel House and Rafael Haney 
wherein those two threatened him if he said anything to the 
police about those two. That he -- he interpreted their 
threats to be essentially a death threat. 
THE COURT: Who threatened him, I!m sorry, I missed 
that part? 
MR. HOWARD: Excuse me? 
THE COURT: Who did he contend threatened him? 
MR. HOWARD: Ezekiel House and Rafael Haney, both of 
whom are black males who were at the party. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay, thank you for the proffer. 
My ruling remains the same. I would suggest that we take a 
short break to give the prosecution a chance to talk to, is it 
Mr. Zippro who is here or Mr. Butler or both? 
MR. HOWARD: I believe it!s Mr. Butler. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you have a date on the notes 
that you were referring to, referring to your meeting with 
Mr. Etsitty? 
MR. HOWARD: Judge, the notes that I was referring to 
while making the proffer were notes based on notes I took from 
the police interview that was provided to us by the State. 
THE COURT: So you didn!t make any notes when you 













essentially, and this 
_ _ _ | 
Have you interviewed him? 
I did speak with him in October. 
And there were no notes from that 
My recollection is what he told us 
is my recollection, was that his story 







My question was did you make any notes? 
I don't believe so, no. 
Okay. All right. Let me give the State 
an opportunity to talk to Mr. Butler who appears to be the only 





That's my understanding. 
And both Mr. Zippro and Mr. Butler were 
subpoenaed for this morning, is that correct, or advised to be 










matter? And this is 
taken care of 
THE COURT: 
Yes, Judge. 1 
Okay. You may go ahead and talk to 1 
Thank you, your Honor. 1 
Your Honor, may I address an unrelated 
again something that I believe needs to be 
Yeah, but time is ticking and we've got a 
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jury waiting. 
MR. HOWARD: We would like to make a record of an 
objection that was made yesterday at the bench and this is in 
relation to State's Exhibit 34, a photograph of the living room 
of the house. This is the photograph that contained a 
picture — or at the bottom of the photograph there was a hand 
and a foot belonging to the deceased in this case. We had 
objected to that on the grounds that the relevance the State 
wanted to introduce the photo for was to show what the window 
treatments or lack thereof were on the front window. 
THE COURT: And the lighting. 
MR. HOWARD: And to show the lighting. 
THE COURT: Since it was taken while the body was 
still there it gives it a time as well as the content. 
MR. HOWARD: Our position, for the record, would be 
that the detective through whom that photograph was introduced 
was perfectly capable of telling when the photograph was taken. 
The presence of the body was not necessary to establish when 
the photograph was taken. We believe that the photograph is 
unnecessary, it's irrelevant at least in terms of the presence 
of the hand and the foot, and that a redacted or cropped 
version of the photo would be equally suitable to achieve the 
StateT s intended purpose. 
THE COURT: If I cropped the photograph before 
allowing the jury to take it into the jury room, would you 
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stipulate that that photograph had in it a photograph of the 
body and the victim? 
MR. HOWARD: I believe the photograph has already 
been published to the jury. 
THE COURT: If m aware of that, Counsel, and that 
wasn't my question. Are you listening to what I'm saying? 
MR. HOWARD: I am, Judge. 
THE COURT: I am saying that I am considering 
cropping it at this point so that when they go into the jury 
room to deliberate it will — they will have a cropped version. 
I am aware obviously that they've seen it once. Now, my 
question to you is, will you stipulate and agree that this was 
taken while the body was still in the room? Because an issue 
has been made of the fact that there was no lighting in the 
house. And there has been a question about what the status of 
the lighting was at the time of the killing. Now that's my 
question to you. 
MR. HOWARD: Judge, we would stipulate that the body 
was still in the room, but we would in no way stipulate that 
that was the lighting condition when the critical events in 
this case occurred. The photograph was taken — it's not clear 
exactly how long after the death and after the shooting. And 
we would in no way stipulate that the light was on — 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HOWARD: — when the events occurred. 
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THE COURT: So it becomes a critical question and Ifm 
going to allow the photograph. And it is not in my opinion a 
gruesome photograph. I have precluded the use of several 
gruesome photographs depicting the body and in the manner in 
which it was lying, finding that they are more prejudicial than 
probative. This photograph, however, just shows a leg and an 
arm. I do not find it to be gruesome in any respect. I find 
it to be highly probative of an issue before the trier of fact, 
and that is what the lighting situation was, whether or not 
there were draperies at the window. And since there is an 
issue in defense's mind as to whether there was lighting on, 
becomes very clear that that photograph is a key piece of 
evidence. And as they say, a photograph is worth a thousand 
words. 
Since one of the issues has been whether or not the 
law enforcement officers? recollection and the witnesses! 
recollection of whether or not the room was lit is a key issue, 
this goes to that issue and I believe will aid the trier of 
fact in making an assessment of whether there was lighting or 
whether there wasn't. You're certainly entitled to 
cross-examine on that issue, asking witnesses if the lighting 
was the same as it was in the photograph at the time of the 
shooting. But I'm going to allow the photograph. Since there 
is no stipulation as to the fact that the body was there and 
the lighting was as depicted in the photograph, I'll let the 
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finder of fact make that assessment. 
Is there anything further? 
MS. TREASE: Judge, one last issue since the State 
has rested in this case. 
THE COURT: Just one moment. Mr. Hall, do you want 
to go outside and start talking with this witness because we1re 
losing time? 
MR. HALL: No, actually, your Honor, 
Detective Delahunty has started that process already. Thank 
you. 
THE COURT: All right. Yes, Ms. Trease. 
MS. TREASE: Since the State has ended their case, 
Judge, we would make this motion at this time. I feel that 
this is the appropriate time to make a motion to dismiss for 
the StateTs failure to meet its burden before the defense puts 
on their case. 
THE COURT: All right. So noted. And the motion is 
denied. There has been a great deal of evidence adduced by at 
least two eyewitnesses that are uncontroverted at this juncture 
as to the charges indicating probable cause to believe it 
occurred and the defendant was the shooter and it's an issue 
for the finder of fact. The motion to dismiss as to any or all 
of the counts is denied. 
All right, would you like to take some time and talk 
to the witness? 
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MS. WISSLER: I would, your Honor. And I would also 
like for clarification, if I could from Counsel, I was looking 
through this transcript of Mr. Etsitty!s testimony and for — 
or his interview, I!ve read this interview three times last 
night and I read it again this morning, and I was following 
along with counsel as he was making his proffer, and I don't 
find any reference in this transcript to any threat that was 
made by any person, not — let alone Rafael Haney or Ezekiel 
House. So if counsel would be kind enough to direct me to a 
page to which hefs referring. 
THE COURT: Mr. Howard, would you indicate to counsel 
where that reference is located? 
MR. HOWARD: Judge, that may have been discussed in 
October when I spoke to him. It may not be from the police 
interview. I — 
THE COURT: Are you able to find a reference to that 
in the interview transcript? 
MR. HOWARD: Judge, on page 17 at the bottom of the 
page he makes reference to running into Rafael at Papiyons, a 
club that he had gone to a couple of days after — a couple of 
days after the events in this case. It was at that club and 
this -- I don't see a specific reference in the police 
interview to threats, but it was that encounter with Rafael at 
Papiyons. 
THE COURT: And that was told to you rather than put 
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in the report or the transcript; is that correct? 
MR. HOWARD: That may be, yes. If it's not in the 
police interview, it must have been — 
THE COURT: I'm asking you is it in the police 
interview. 
MR. HOWARD: I did not see a specific reference to 
the threats in the police interview. 
THE COURT: All right. You have an answer to that 
question. 
MS. WISSLER: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Who is your first witness going to be? 
Hopefully someone on the witness list. 
MS. TREASE: Your Honor, Jacob Valdez is on the 
State's witness list, we told Mr. Hall yesterday that we 
intended to call him since he was not called by the State. I 
believe he will be our first witness. 
MS. WISSLER: There's no objection, your Honor. 
MR. HALL: There's no objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Would you like to proceed or would you 
like to wait until you've had an opportunity to talk to 
Mr. Butler? I can indicate to you that at such point as 
Ms. Trease or co-counsel wishes to call Mr. Butler, if you 
haven't had a full hour to talk to him I won't allow him to 
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1 Q — acquainted with her at all? 
2 A I had heard good things about her. One of my best 
3 friends changed — 
4 MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, objection, nonresponsive. 
5 j THE COURT: Sir, the question is were you acquainted 
6 with her at all? 
7 THE WITNESS: No. 
8 Q (BY MR. HOWARD) Were you familiar with the Isakson 
9 family at all? 
10 A I knew her -- her youngest sister from school, Kearns 
11 High School. 
12 I Q Do you have any bad feelings toward the Isakson 
13 family? 
14 A I feel real bad. Real bad. 
15 Q Now, after you heard shots being fired that night, 
16 did you receive a phone call from anyone? 
17 A Yeah, I got a phone call from one of my second 
18 cousins. 
19 MS. WISSLER: Objection, nonresponsive. 
20 Q (BY MR. HOWARD) And --
21 THE COURT: The question is after the shoots were 
22 fired that night, did you receive a phone call from anyone? 
23 That can be answered yes or no. 
24 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
25 Q (BY MR. HOWARD) And this is a yes or no question, 
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Ifll follow it up. 
THE COURT: HeTs answered it yes. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q (BY MR. HOWARD) Who did you receive that phone call 
from? 
A James. 
Q Do you know Jamesf last name? 
A Itfs Storm. 
Q How do you know James? 
A I know James through my — he!s -- his sister had a 
baby by my cousin, so hefs my cousin. 
Q How long have you known James? 
A For about eight years. 
Q Have you had many conversations with James? 
MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, I!m going to object, it!s 
irrelevant and beyond the scope of cross-examination. 
THE COURT: Please approach. 
(Side-bar conference.) 
THE COURT: Miguel, can you get that question for me 
from the jury? 
MR. HOWARD: Should we wait? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. HOWARD: Okay. 
Q (BY MR. HOWARD) Are you familiar with what James' 
voice typically sounds like? 
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A Yes. 
Q Have you had phone conversations with him? 
A Yes. 
Q Did his voice sound unusual? 
A Yes. 
THE COURT: The comment from the jurors is we can't 
hear the questions, we can't hear the answers. So, Counsel, 
you need to speak up. And you need to speak louder and into 
the microphone if you would, please, 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 
Q (BY MR. HOWARD) I'll try to keep my voice up. Did 
James' voice sound unusual to you when you got that phone call? 
A Yes. 
Q In what way was it unusual? 
A He sounded like he was startled. 
Q What -- can you elaborate on that, what did you mean 
by startled? 
A Just stuttering, because he told me he saw something. 
Q He was stuttering? 
A Like he was I — I — I — I — I — I — I just saw 
Zeke and Raf shoot Kehndra. 
MS. WISSLER: Objection, your Honor, move to strike. 
THE COURT: Sustained. You are to absolutely 
disregard what you just heard. Put it out of your mind as if 
you never heard it. It was an improper response. Do not 
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consider that in any way whatsoever. 
Q (BY MR. HOWARD) Does James normally stutter when he 
speaks? 
A No. 
Q Was his tone of voice different? 
A Yes. 
Q How was it different? 
A It was different, he was screaming, yelling. 
Q Is that how he normally talks? 
A No, he doesn't. 
Q Did he tell you why he seemed upset? 
MS. WISSLER: Objection, calls for hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. HOWARD: Judge, we1re trying to lay the 
foundation for why this is an excited utterance. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Please take the baby out. 
Let me get counsel to approach. 
(Side-bar conference.) 
Q (BY MR. HOWARD) When did you receive this phone 
call? 
A I had received it right when I had got to my car, it 
was probably like 12 minutes after the shooting. 
Q Twelve minutes after you had heard the shots? 
A Yeah, or ten minutes. I donft know. 
L 
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Q Did James give any indication to you why he — why he 
was upset or excited? 
A Yes. 
MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, calls for hearsay. 
THE COURT: The question called for a yes or no 
answer and he said yes. Follow-up questions may in fact 
require hearsay, but the last question did not. 
Q (BY MR. HOWARD) Did he tell you whether he had seen 
something unusual? 
A Yes. 
THE COURT: It may be answered yes or no. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q (BY MR. HOWARD) Did he tell you whether he had seen 
something that had shaken him up? 
A Yes. 
Q Did he tell you what he had seen? 
A Yes. 
Q Was it something that would normally shake or disturb 
a person? 
A Yes. 
MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, objection, leading, and it 
calls for speculation. 
THE COURT: Sustained on both bases. 
MS. WISSLER: I!d move to strike that response, your 
Honor. 
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THE COURT: The response is stricken. Please 
disregard it. 
(Counsel confer off the record.) 
Q (BY MR. HOWARD) The conversation that you had with 
James Storm, was it calm and collected? 
A No. 
Q Was he making relaxed statements or was he blurting 
things out? 
A He was blurting things out. 
Q Were you asking him questions? 
A I just — yeah, he just — yeah. Yes. 
Q Did he tell you what had excited him? 
A Yes. 
THE COURT: You can answer yes or no. 
Q (BY MR. HOWARD) What did he tell you had excited 
him? 
MS. WISSLER: Objection, your Honor, calls for 
hearsay — 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. HOWARD: Judge, the basis for getting — 
THE COURT: Counsel, please approach. We are not 
going to argue in front of the jury. 
(Side-bar conference.) 
THE COURT: Did you have a voir dire question? 
MS. WISSLER: I -- your Honor — 
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VOIR DIRE EXAMINATICN 
BY MS. WISSLER: 
Q Mr. Cosstello, you indicated to Mr. Howard here that 
you spoke to James Storm 12 minutes after this incident 
occurred; is that right? Twelve minutes? 
A Yeah, I was just getting — from the time that I had 
got to my car. 
Q Okay. But in fact, you told the police that you 
didn't speak with James until the day after the shooting, 
didn!t you? 
A No, I had told the officers I talked to him. 
Q Would it refresh your memory as to what you told the 
police if I showed you the transcript? 
A Yeah. 
Q With benefit of that transcript, it's true, is it 
not, that you told the detective that you did not speak to 
James until the day after the shooting? 
A Yes. 
DIRECT EXZMDSlATiasr CCNTD. 
BY MR. HOWARD: 
Q Isaac, was James at the party that night? 
A Yes. 
Q You saw him? 
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A Yes. 
Q You heard a fight occur upstairs; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Did that scare you? 
A Yes. 
Q Did that excite you? 
A Startled me. 
Q And by excited, I don't mean in a good way 
necessarily, but either good or bad, were you excited? 
A Yeah. 
Q Did it shake you up? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know if James was there when the fight 
occurred? 
A Yes. 
Q Was he there when the fight occurred? 
A He was upstairs. 
Q Were other people who were there at the party 
disturbed or shaken up when the fight occurs? 
MS. WISSLER: Objection, calls for speculation. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (BY MR. HOWARD) Did they appear to you to be shaken 
or disturbed when the fight occurred? 
THE COURT: Hef s indicated that he did not go 
upstairs. 
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Q (BY MR. HOWARD) Were the people in the basement 
excited or disturbed? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you talk to James regarding events that occurred 
at the party? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you talk to him about the fight? 
A Yes. 
Q Did he make any indications to you about what he 
observed during the fight? 
A Yes. 
Q Did he appear to be shaken by what he had observed? 
A Yes. 
Q What did he tell you he observed? 
MS. WISSLER: Objection, calls for hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (BY MR. HOWARD) Now, you say you saw Zeke and 
Rafael at the party? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall what Rafael was wearing? 
A No. I can't recall. 
Q Do you recall what Zeke was wearing? 
A Dark clothes. 
Q Do you know what Zeke!s hair was like? 
A Yeah, he had an afro. 
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Q Did he have anything in his hair? 
A A pick. 
Q What about Rafael's hair? 
A He had braids on right then. 
Q Did he have anything else in his hair? 
A There might have been a do rag. 
Q What do you mean by a do rag? 
A I donft know. It's like a rag you throw over your 
head. I don!t know. 
Q Made of cloth, I assume? 
A Yeah, made of cloth. 
Q Can you describe generally what it looks like? 
A It just ties like down right here, and then you tie 
it back here. 
THE COURT: Pointing to his forehead as being the 
area covered and the back of the head. 
MR. HOWARD: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: Cross? 
MS. WISSLER: If I could have just have a minute, 
your Honor. 
Nothing further from the State, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may stand down. Thank you for your 
assistance. You are excused. 
Next witness. 
MS. KOCH: Your Honor, at this time the State would 
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call Matthew Pollock, 
THE COURT: We1re going to take a ten-minutes recess 
at this time. Forgive me. The people on the jury are probably 
feeling precisely the same way, and counsel probably. 
Wefre going to take a ten-minute recess. Remember 
not to discuss the case, not to form an opinion, but continue 
to keep an open mind. Forgive me. 
(A brief recess.) 
(The following proceedings were held in open court 
out of the presence of the jury.) 
THE COURT: Okay, we're back on the record. 
Is there anything before we bring in the jury? 
MR. HOWARD: Judge, if I could have benefit of the 
record in relation to some of the things that were discussed at 
the bench during the last break. 
THE COURT: Just a moment. You may proceed. 
MR. HOWARD: We would like to make the proffer as to 
what the previous witness, Isaac Costello Martinez, would have 
testified to in relation to a phone call he received from James 
Storm. He had testified that he received that phone call 12 
minutes or so after he had jumped over the fence. Our proffer 
would be that James would — that Isaac would have testified 
that during that phone call James told him that he was still 
walking away from the party and that he needed someone to pick 
him up. That he had left the party and had been in the front 
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yard when the shootings occurred. That he had been there when 
the fight started. That he had gone into the front yard and 
that he had seen Zeke and Rafael shooting guns towards the 
house. 
Additionally on a different issue, it was discussed 
at the bench, it!s our position that the voir dire conducted by 
the prosecution went beyond the purpose of voir dire and was 
cross-examination designed more to interrupt the — 
THE COURT: I stopped the cross-examinational aspects 
of the voir dire, as you111 recall, as soon as you called it to 
my attention. I told counsel she had gone beyond and asked you 
to proceed where you were. 
MR. HOWARD: Judge, I believe some of the voir dire 
that the prosecution engaged in subsequent to that was also in 
the nature of cross-examination. 
MR. HALL: Subsequent --
THE COURT: That's not my recollection. But if it 
was, I don't see that there's any harm because it could have 
been asked as cross-examination in any event. With reference 
to the alleged spontaneous utterance, despite the fact that 
counsel used exclusively leading questions to try to elicit 
from the witness that there was a spontaneous component to the 
statement he heard from another individual, that did not come 
out. The best we heard was that someone may have been startled 
and there is a discrepancy as to what the timing of the 
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statement was, whether it was some 9 to 12 minutes after the 
episode or whether it was the next day. There is no 
opportunity for cross-examination, no opportunity for 
confrontation of this witness. Itfs not the proper sort of 
testimony that qualifies in this Court1s opinion as a 
spontaneous utterance. Adequate foundation was not laid. 
Having said that, let's bring in the jury. 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, if I could briefly add to 
this our position, and this is just for benefit of the record, 
I apologize to the Court but our position would be that time 
difference alluded to by the prosecution goes to credibility or 
weight of the evidence not to the admissibility thereof. 
THE COURT: I understand. If the witness had been 
asked nonleading questions and had volunteered the timing and 
the nature of the — or the spontaneity of what was said it 
would be a very different matter. On the contrary, even though 
he was led, he indicated that what James had told him was in 
response to questions from him. That it was not spontaneous 
comments, and therefore that is one of the many things the 
Court has considered. Incidentally, the witness blurted out 
the answer in any event. And despite the fact that the Court 
has asked the jury to disregard that, as we all know, once 
something has been said it's very hard for people to forget 
it's been said. So frankly, the defense has managed to get in 
the statement in any event. 
555 
